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Selected Glossary 
~f 
Philosophical Terms 
A CLEAR understanding of the meaning of words is indispen-sable in all fields of intellectual acitivity. Consequently, the 
attainment of such an understanding is one of the primary tasks for 
the college student in each subject which is undertaken. Faced with 
the gen·eral vagueness of words and the common lack of precise 
definition in their spoken and written usage, the student must 
recognize that the meaning of words is a complicated and difficult 
affair, and, more especially, he must come to an early realization 
that all terms require precise and studied definition. 
Especially is this necessary in philosophy, which uses many 
words quite new to the average student and many, more apparently 
familiar, words in an unfamiliar sense. Now that the absence of a 
background in Greek and Latin is the rule rather than the excep-
tion, the beginning student comes to the study of philosophy with-
out the necessary elements for comprehending the subject. This 
selected glossary of philosophical terms is designed to aid the 
student in acquiring an early understanding of the more common 
and fundamental terms in philosophy. The student should be 
warned, however, that any definition of philosophical terms really 
presupposes a philosophy. And while my intention has been to state 
the more traditional definitions for the most part, they inevitably 
contain more or less of my own interpretation. 
In no sense, however, is this glossary intended to serve as an 
easy substitute for careful reading and serious effort toward under-
standing. Much less is it designed to provi'de the student with a 
facile vocabulary for superficially impressive use. Consequently, no 
effort has been exerted toward definition in basic words of one 
syllable, and, in line with this, no attempt has been made to avoid 
-3 . 
the use of a word in a given definition where that word itself needs 
to be defined. Such words, however, have been placed in italics to 
indicate that they have been defined in their proper place. This 
system had been adopted in the belief that the conscientious study 
of the meaning of such words and the assimilation of them back 
again into the original definition is itself one of the best ways for 
rapidly acquiring an adequate working grasp of the meaning of 
philosophical terms. 
In preparing these definitions from many different sources, I have 
checked each one with the Dictionary of Philosophy and/ or with 
the Oxford English Dictionary. Where in the case of certain words 
there is an exceptionally good article in Basting's Encyclopaedia 
of Reli_qion and Ethics, I have so indicated, naming the author and 
using the abbreviation "Enc. of R. & E." The illustrative quota-
tions have been taken for the most part either from H. L. Mencken's 
A New Dictionary of Quotations or from the Oxforfl English 
Dictionary. It is my pleasure to thank Professor Harry T. Costello, 
Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, for his many valuable 
criticisms and friendly suggestions. The errors and omissions are, 
however, entirely mine. 
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BLANCHARD w. MEANS, Ptt.D., 
Trinity College, Hart ford, 
April 2nd, 1943 . 
Selected Glossary 
of 
Philosoph1cal Terms 
Absolute, a, Unconditioned, ultimate, independent of other ground 
or justification; sometimes used to mean objective in opposition 
both to relative and to subjective. In Medieval Philosophy used 
to signify freedom from natural or physical limitations; un-
caused, unconditioned, etc. In Modern Philosophy it is used to 
mean universal, complete, perfect, objective, ultimate; the oppo-
site of relative, etc., ex. absolute truth, absolute moral values, 
absolute time, and so on. ( Due to its imposing sound, venerable 
tradition, and continued difficulty, perhaps the worst word with 
which to begin a simplified glossary of terms-but unfortunately 
a-b can only be alphabetically preceded by a!) 
Absolute (The), n. (Even more unfortunate!) In Medieval 
Philosophy sometimes vaguely used to signify the ultimately real, 
whatever it is. In Modern Philosophy used by Idealists, follow-
ing Hegel, to signify the ultimately real as of a certain kind, 
namely one all-inclusive mind or spirit; the whole as perfect; a 
metaphysical interpretation of reality as completely interrelated 
and rational in direct opposition to naturalism and also to all 
relativistic theories; metaphysical wholeness and rationality 
(Hegel) ; aesthetic completeness ( Bosanquet) ; moral perfection 
and ultimate goodness of Reality (Royce). 
A hstract, a. In Logic, a term conventionally considered to have 
connotation but no denotation; a type or kind of term which 
names a quality or attribute of a thing as isolated from the 
existent thing, ex. redness; contrasted with so-called concrete 
terms, ex. dogginess vs. dog. For suggestions as to the deeper 
philosophical problems involved see nominalism and realism. 
5. 
Abstraction, n. The process of ~entally isolating qualities or 
aspects of an existential object or event from the given object or 
event. 
Accident, n. A quality or an attribute of an object or existent 
which is not part of its essence or necessary being but which is, 
just the same, part of it; contrasted with property as a necessary 
or essential quality or attribute (Aristotle), ex. the snubnose of 
Socrates as a man is an "accident" in contrast to his reason as a 
"property" of men. In Medieval Scholasticism used in contrast 
to substance which has independent or self-sufficient existence 
while an accident exists only in a substance-or in another acci-
dent which in turn exists only in a substance, etc. 
Act, n. Any operation; anything which one does-reflexively, by 
"instinct", by compulsion, and so on; more especially any form 
of conduct originating in or (supposedly) resulting from the 
human will. In Ethics the act as a particular inst~nce of conduct 
is sometimes sharply distinguished from the motive as the volun-
tary impulsion to the act and from the consequences which follow 
from it. The rightness or moral value of the act is then some-
times judged as to the inherent quality or type of act itself, ex. 
the act of telling a lie is always bad (Formalism), or it may be 
judged primarily in terms of its motive (Kant), or it may be 
judged exclusively by the expediency or social success of its 
consequences ( Pragmatism, lnstrumentalism, etc.). In contrast 
to this separation of motive, act, and consequences, the more 
teleological views consider the act and the moral evaluation of it 
to involve both the motive and the consequence, ( Aristotle, etc.) 
Theologically, any striking or unusual happening, generally evil, 
outside the sphere of human causation and control and directly 
credited to God, ex. earthquakes as an "act of God". "Act of 
God" is also used to cover human ignorance of causes, and to 
limit the liability of insurance companies. 
Actuality, n. That which exists in space and time, particular 
- · existence; contrasted with the potential but not realized ( Aris-
totle), with the possible or formal (Modern); the so-called 
"brute facts" as distinguished from all human purposes, wishes, 
dreams, and illusions. See existence . 
. 6 
Ad hoc. In Logic an argument of dubious relevance, or more 
often of no relevance at all, which is arbitrarily brought in after 
the fact in order to explain the given or accomplished fact; or an 
explanation not general enough to fit any case but this particul~r 
case alone ; special. 
Adventitious, a. Extrinsic in contrast to intrinsic; added to some- · 
thing from the outside. In Philosophy adventitious ideas are those 
which are or appear to be given to or caused in the mind from 
outside the mind; contrasted with innate ideas. For example, one 
argument, generally considered to be a form of the ontologz;al 
argument, which Descartes uses for the existence of God is based 
on adventitious ideas as follows: I have an idea of God as 
perfect by definition. But I am not myself perfect, and since 
the effect cannot be greater than the cause, therefore this original 
idea of God that I have can only be caused in my mind from the 
outside by God's existence. 
Aesthetics, n. That branch of philosophy concerned with the 
critical study and interpretation of art and beautJ•; the systematic 
analysis and interpretation of the process of art-creation, the 
characteristic art-objects created, and the observer's or appreci-
ator's experienced response both to these man-made objects and 
to nature as experienced aesthetically. In its modern meaning, as 
just given, the term "aesthetics" was first used by Baumgarten 
about 17 50, and was established in this usage by Hegel about 
1800. Used by Kant in its more literal sense or meaning of 
perception. 
A est he tic, a. In accord with principles of aesthetics; an am-
biguous term used as implying general agreement with the 
principles of "good taste"-usually as held by the particular 
per on using the word. 
Aesthetic experience. The appreciative enjoyment of a perceived 
object in and for itself; intense absorption in the perception of 
an object in and for itself without regard to practical, moral, or 
ideational concerns. 
Aesthetic quality. The generic differentia of all aesthetic objects, 
which is sometimes considered to be ultimate and unique 
(Greene), and as such, like rationality, life, consciousness, and 
7_. 
moral goodness, to be indefinable. All that can then be defined 
are the conditions under which objects with aesthetic quality 
appear, while the empirical fact of such aesthetic quality is only 
given in immediate, first hand, and relevant experience. 
Agent, n. Commonly a person who acts or does something. In 
ethics a person is considered to be a moral agent only when he 
is ( 1) self-responsible, (2) free, in the sense of being undeter-
mined at least to some extent by previous, purely physical causes, 
and ( 3) rational, more or less. That is, to be a moral agent one 
must possess the conditions for making ethical choices, right or 
wrong, good or bad, etc. More broadly, a human being is an 
agent when he feels his own experience immediately from within, 
in contrast to the mode of viewing human action and experi-
ence from the outside as observer. "There is no greater difference 
than the difference between the way a thing feels when you do 
it yourself and the way it looks when you see it done by another; 
between having an experience and contemplating the expression 
of such an experience." (Fite). The distinction between agent 
and observer in this sense is one too frequently neglected both in 
Philosophy and in Science. 
A gnosticism, n. The epistemological doctrine that there is an ob-
jective truth but that it is unknowable; man's inevitable igno-
rance of reality, of all true ultimates of matter, mind, and God; 
all human knowledge is considered finite and limited as dealing 
only with the relative; all ultimate issues are uncertain and in 
doubt.· 
A /truism, n. Acting for the good of other people; other-regarding 
actions as contrasted with self-regarding ones; technically opposed 
to e.r;oism; commonly opposed to selfishness. Sometimes identified 
with self-sacrifice and even with self-denial. 
Ambiguous, a. Capable of two or more interpretations; vague-
ness or confusion as to the meaning of a word; the use of a term 
in such a way or context that its intended meaning is apt to be 
replaced, without noticing the interchange, by a related but 
essentially different meaning. Logic distinguishes the various 
ways in which words are ambiguous, as to form, sound, deno-
tation, and connotation . 
. 8 
Ambiguity is the noun which names the vagueness or unguarded 
shift of meaning in the use of words. It is found in all fields of 
intellectual activity, and is one of the primary sources of mis-
understanding and fallacious reasoning. The antidote for it 1s 
clarity and precision of definition. 
A moral, a. Sometimes considered to be literary and so inexcus-
able for technical usage according to some writers-see non-
moral. Actually more traditionally sophisticated than "non-
moral", although meaning the same thing, namely an act, agent, 
or, event which is neither moral nor immoral, neither right nor 
wrong, etc.; natural desires as such are merely natural (Kant); 
so also all natural events of the physical world are generally 
considered amoral or value-free. 
Analogy, n. The logical process of reasoning from parallel cases 
or similar characters. Ex. Because Mercury and Venus resemble 
the planets Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn in the character 
of revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, we conclude 
that they also resemble those planets in rotating around an axis. 
Analogical reasoning is really a form of probable inference, and 
is based upon the assumption that where things are observed to 
have certain similar attributes they will have other similar 
attributes. Analogy is used in natural science in the more spe-
cialized sense of resemblance of structure or function between 
organs which are essentially different. 
Analysis, n. The process of breaking down an idea or situation 
into its component parts or elements. This process belongs to the 
logical method of refiective thought, and as such applies to all 
fields of intellectual activity. In recent logic analysis is identified 
with deductive methods; older and idealistic logic considered 
deduction as primarily synthetic. In mathematics, starting from 
the unknown ( x). Hence any method that uses algebra. 
Analytic, a. The adjective for analysis; belonging to the process 
of logical analysis (Aristotle). 
Analytic judgment, n. This is a term used by philosophy for a 
proposition in which the predicate is contained in the subject, 
with the result that no new information is given about the subject 
in the predicate (Kant). Ex. Perfection is the highest value. 
9. 
Antecedent, a. &· n. As a noun it is used in logic to name the 
part of a conditional proposition for which the consequence :is 
stated, ex. If it rains (antecedent), the ground is wet • ( con-
, sequence). It is also used as an adjective to mean previous to in 
time or in order, and as a noun for the preceding thing or event. 
This is its common use in scientific method, ex. A comes before 
B in time or in order-A is then antecedent to B> or A is an 
antecedent of B. In the idea of necessary antecedent it is used 
as syn011ymous with cause. "Circumstance~ . . . governed by 
11 long chain of antecedents." Buckle . 
.A posteriori, Latin. Used to designate knowledge or principles 
derived from experience. Opposed to a priori. Also used to 
characterize reasoning from axioms. "Knowledge a posteriori 
is a synonym for knowledge expirical or from experience." Sir 
Wm. Hamilton. · 
A priori, Latin. Used to designate knowledge or principles which 
are not derived from experience; prior to experience, innate in 
the mind; knowledge and principles obtained logically-not 
temporarily-prior to sense-experience, although their applica-
tion may be; and usually is, exclusively to such experience, ex. 
Kant's categories, such as causality, substance, and so on, which 
are the forms of experience but are not derived from experience. 
Opposed to a posteriori. Also used to characterize reasoning from 
assumed axioms, deductively, in contrast to reasoning from em-
pirical data or experience. "The term a pdori is now employed 
to characterize those elements of knowledge which . . . as 
native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of 
experience." Sir Wm. Hamilton. Sometimes carelessly used as 
presumptive reasoning; a conclusion formulated by some indi-
vidual without sufficient experience. 
Art, n. Loosely used as synonymous with kill; the knowledge of 
the principles involved in the creation of beautiful objects or in 
the making of useful things (Aristotle), ex. the "art" of writing 
poetry or the "art" of shoe-making. More narrowly, and, except 
for John Dewey and others, more usually the term is restricted to 
designate a unique and individual man-made organization of 
some appropriate medium, paints and canvas, musical notes, 
marble, words, etc., which is intrinsically satisfying and inher-
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ently meaningful; man-made objects possessing aesthetic quality 
as the result of man's intentional creation. 
Association, n. The mental connection between an object or event 
and ideas, or the connection in the mind between ideas; the 
process of forming such mental connections. 
Laws of association are the psychological description of the major 
factors ( factors of advantage) in the forming of such mental 
connections between ideas or between events and ideas. The four 
major factors are usually considered to be frequency, recency, 
vividness, and effect. In forming associations there may but 
need not be a natural or inherent connection between the ideas 
or events and ideas mentally related. Thus, we may associate 
the tactile values of coldness and softness with the visual image 
of snow, or link the fragrance of gardenias with steam loco-
motives. Thus, association by contiguity, similarity, etc. One 
school of psychology in England tried to explain all mental events 
by association. 
Assumption, n. A proposition which is simply taken as a starting 
point from which inferences may be drawn; while the proposi-
tion thus taken may be believed to be true, or possibly true, it 
need not necessarily be so, or even be considered to be "self-
evident". Although sometimes used as synonymous with axiom 
or postulate, the term "assumption" agrees only with the modern 
mathematical use of axiom, and lacks the logical implication for 
its acceptance which is contained in the meaning of postulate as 
the necessary consequence of an antecedent situation which has 
been established on other grounds. See postulate and presupposi-
tion. 
Axiology, n. That branch of philosophy which critically studies 
the nature, function, criteria, and metaphysical status of values. 
Axiom, n. A proposition accepted without proof or demonstra-
tion; a "first principle", usually considered to be self-evident; 
used as the foundation for logical inference and demonstration, 
ex. the axioms of geometry (Euclid) on which the science is 
logically constructed but which are themselves simply accepted. 
Used for all sciences to mean foundation principle. "The axiom 
that the whole is greater than its parts." H. Spencer. In modern 
11. 
mathematics, an assumed starting point, not necessarily self-
evident, or even asserted to be true. Cf. J. Royce-"Axiom", 
Enc. of R. & E., V. 2. 
Becoming> n. The process qf changing properties--contrasted with 
motion as the change of place or position, ex. an acorn becomes 
an oak tree, while a billiard ball moves on a table. 
Being; n. The most general term for existence; just something 
rather than nothing; that which "is" as the source and ground 
of all qualifications and distinctions (Spinoza) ; that which Is 
in the sense of essential nature, ex. the being of God. Used in 
early Greek philosophy as the permanent, changeless, eternal, in 
opposition to both non-being and becoming. 
Belief; n. The willingness to stake something important on an 
opinion as true. The usual distinction in philosophy is between 
knowledge and opinion. Belief has a qualitative implication of 
fundamental personal certainty rather than designating a degree 
of logical certainty. In this, its philosophical use is close to its 
common meaning of trust or confidence in something or some-
one. Used in religion for the acceptance of theological inter-
pretations, as belief in God, in his existence, power, goodness 
and so on. "We talked of belief in ghosts." Boswell. "Lord, I 
believe; help thou mine unbelief." Mark IX, 24. ( Incidentally, 
this is, perhaps and/ or probably, the greatest prayer or funda-
mental cry of the human soul.) 
Body> n. The physical matter and organic structure of man; con-
trasted with his mind, spirit, or soul. This distinction between 
body and mind or spirit gives rise to the problem of the relation 
between them-the so-called mind-body problem. See dualism, 
etc. The term "body" as transferred to matter in general is used 
to signify any material thing. 
Casuistry; n. In medieval scholasticism, the elaborate investigation 
of ·an "cases of conscience" in order to classify and codify all 
possible human acts in a comprehensive system of categories and 
general principles, so that all actual conflicts of obligation may be 
resolved, and all conceivable, concrete instances of human con-
duct be judged as to guilt, responsibility, and proper penance 
according to definite rule and established precedents. Such 
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legalism, involving as it must, the necessity to determine the 
degree of guilt and to weigh all circumstances of the case in 
minute detail, encouraged the effort to find all sorts of excep-
tions and hair-splitting allowances under the systematised rules, 
so that "casuistry" came to have the odious implication of moral 
equivocation, legal trickery, and clever avoidance of guilt and 
deserved responsibility. I ts modern usage generally carries this 
odious connotation. 
Categorernatic, a. In logic, used to signify words which can be 
used by themselves as names, i.e. nouns and adjectives used as 
nouns; opposed to syncategorematic words which cannot denote 
a term by themselves, i.e. adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions. 
Categorical, a. Direct, flat-footed, absolute, unconditional. Used 
in logic to designate an unqualified proposition as opposed to a 
conditional one, i.e. a categorical proposition makes an unqualified 
assertion with no strings attached, ex. The house is red, No 
man is perfect, while a conditional proposition makes an assertion 
which depends upon an antecedent statement, ex. If it rains, 
then the ground is wet. Used in ethics as an unconditional cqm-
mand or imperative. Thus the "categorical imperative" is · the 
. supreme and absolute moral law of all rational beings (Kant). 
Category, n. An a priori concept which the mind or understand:-
ing applies as a form of sense-experience, ex. the Kantian cat~ 
egories of substance, self, causality, etc.; the Kantian categories 
are the ways in which the mind organizes its knowledge ( in 
addition to space and time). In Aristotle, any one of the ultimate 
modes of being, or the widest predicates, such as substance, 
quantity, quality, relation, place, date, position, state, acti'on, 
passivity, which can be predicated of a nameable entity to tell 
us just what kind of entity it fundamentally is; also used by 
Aristotle simply to designate the predicate of any proposition. 
Causality, n. The relation between a necessary antecedent and an 
effect, variously defined as invariable sequence, necessary condi-
tion, material, efficient, formal, final, and so on. The principle 
or doctrine that all events have a cause, i.e. have causal connec-
tion with preceding events. 
Cause, n. An event followed by another in a relation involving 
power and necessary connection, i.e. A is the cause of B when 
13. 
B is the neces ary result of the occurrence of A; anything which 
produces an effect. Cause as the antecedent ground of an event 
should be carefully distinguished from cause as the reason or pur-
pose of action , which is usuaUy designated "final cause". Thus, 
the legal phrase to "show cause" is a confusing use of the word 
"cause", since it really means to show sufficient reason or motive 
for an action. In cience, a relation of invariable equence so that 
upon the occurrence of a given event another can be definitely 
predicted to follow. Some recent philo opher think that the 
word "cause" i too vague for modern cience, which use terms 
such as law, invariants of process, functional relationship, etc. 
Chance, n. Events appearing or taking place without cause; an 
occurrence which is undetermined ; fortuitous happening. Also 
applied to causes too complex to disentangle, as in the toss of 
a penny. 
Chaos, n. A world without causal connection, in which all con-
junction of events is purely accidental, so that no prediction or 
control is possible and, consequently, no formulation of scientific 
law or any achievement of intention. "The 'formless void' of 
primordial matter." "In the beginning how the Heavens and 
Earth Rose out of Chaos." Milton. 
Choice, n. In ethic , the agent's con ciously volitional selection or 
decision between two or more alternatives. As rational, such 
selection is necessarily directed or determined toward the higher 
or highest value presented in the alternatives. However, choice 
creates the problem as to its real nature, whether it is free, and 
in what sense, or is determined, and if determined, whether it is 
o by reason and value, or by the strongest desire present at the 
time, and simply expressed in the apparent act of choice. 
Class, n. A group of instances, particulars, or individuals having 
ome property or propertie in common ( or sometime the 
absence of a certain property or properties) . Used in logic as a 
term from which all content has been removed except that 
which de ignates the property or properties which an object or 
idea must have to be called by that term or to be considered an 
example of it. That is, all common names are also classes, ex. 
horse, building, man, mouse, etc. Such classes have many mem-
bers. But further, proper and single names constitute a cla 
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having a single member, and imaginative con truct · or fiction , 
such as mermaids, yield a class having no members at all, an 
empty class. A logical class is simply a definition as a definition, 
and as uch has certain logical propertie without regard to 
content. 
Cognition, n. The action or faculty of knowing; knowledge in it · 
widest ense ; one of the three fundamental functions of con-
sciousness·, the other two being conation and affection, i.e., think-
ing, willing, and feeling. 
Coherence, n. The epistemological principle that the true is what 
hangs together or is consistent; it is one of the principles for the 
definition or testing of truth. 
Common-sense, n. Native shrewdness; the ability to think cor-
rectly and validly, and/ or to have an under tanding of experi-
ence and a right appreciation of values, without special education 
and training. Sometimes used in a more specialized way to desig-
nate simply ense that is common to all men, ex. as the sense that 
red is "red", or that hot things are "hot"; common beliefs shared 
by men as unreflectively derived from everyday biological, 
psychological, and social experience, ex. food will satisfy hunger, 
the way to avoid getting wet is to come in out of the rain, etc. 
U ~ed by Aristotle to designate the faculty ( ability or function) 
of the mind which unites the data of the different senses into 
actual objects ( primitive inference). 
Conation, n. The conscious function of volition and desire; voli-
tional activity. See cognition. 
Concept, n. An idea of a class of objects, etc.; a general notion; 
any class term, relational term, or category (Kant) ; a mental 
abstraction from experience by which the intellect tags recurring 
percepts (James) ; a common noun stands for a concept in the 
mind and a universal in things. "Concepts are merely the results, 
rendered permanent by language, of a previous process of com-
parison." Sir Wm. Hamilton. 
Conceptualism, n. The doctrine that universals are real as mental 
concepts and as the organizing principle of things outside the 
mind, but that they have no prior, independent, and intrinsic 
reality in themselves-universalia in re ( universals in things). 
15. 
Conceptualism is a compromise position between scholastic 
Realism and N ominalism. 
Conditional, a. In logic, the "if-clause" in a proposition asserting 
a relation of implication, A ) B; see Categorical. 
Conduct, n. In ethics, any voluntary behavior, whether actually 
done or only intended ; action for which the person acting may be 
·held responsible and consequently subject to moral judgment; 
the conscious or rational behavior of a "moral agent"-see Agent. 
Connotation, n. Loosely used as the meaning (dictionary) of a 
word. In logic, the qualities or attributes which an object, etc., 
must have to be called by a given name or term, i.e. the logical 
characteristics of a term defined. 
Conscience, n. The faculty or function which immediately senses 
the moral quality of one's own actions or motives, commanding 
the right and condemning the wrong (Kant, the Puritans, etc.). 
Kant maintained that the intelligent know the right by reason, 
while the simple (dumb) folk do so by conscience. That there is 
such a faculty is questioned and explained away in terms of habit , 
and socially conditioned emotional atttiudes by many psychol-
ogists, sociologists, etc. 
Consciousness, n. Awareness as a concomitant of all thought, 
feeling and volition; generally considered to be an essentially 
indefinable term. "Consciousness cannot be defined; we may be 
ourselves fully aware what consciousness is, but we cannot with-
out_ confusion convey to others a definition of what we ourselv!!s 
clearly apprehend. The reason is plain: consciousness lies at 
the root of all knowledge." Sir Wm. Hamilton. 
Consequence, n., and also Consequent, n. See Antecedent. 
Contingency, n. Loosely used for a chance occurrence, a happen-
ing which is undetermined. In metaphysics, opposed to deter-
minism. Broadly used in philosophy for an object or occurrence 
which may be or which may take place and also which may not 
be or may not take place. Contingency is then further defined as 
. logical or physical, depending upon the ground in relation to 
which an object or event is considered to be undetermined. Con-
trasted with a narrower use of the word as that which is true only 
. 16 
under certain conditions; a situation which is dependent upon 
another situation, which is itself merely probable or uncertain. 
Contradiction, n. One of the traditional laws of logic which 
states that no proposition can be both true and not true (i.e. 
false) at the same time. Contradiction may be considered as the 
situation that if you are to say anything you cannot also deny it, 
ex. when you state that A is both B and not-B, your statement 
cancels itself, and the result is zero, i.e. you have said nothing. 
Correspondence, n. The epistemological principle that an idea or 
observation is true when it reproduces exactly an actual object 
or situation. Contrasted with the coherence theory of truth, etc. 
See coherence. 
Cosmology, n. The branch of philosophy which studies the origin, 
structure and working of reality-how the universe as a whole 
is put together and how it works; contrasted with ontology. 
Creative evolution, n. A non-naturalistic ( ?) form of emergent 
evolution which explains the appearance of successive stages and 
the diversification of forms within each stage in terms of some 
one-directional driving power or creative principle, ex. "elan 
vital" (Bergson), "Nisus" (Lloyd Morgan, etc.). See emergent 
evolution. 
Crisis theology. The name for a rather popular view among 
present pessimists regarding men and society; it is essentially the 
position of one Karl Barth, that Christianity is entirely a re-
vealed religion in that God is wholly other than man and cannot 
possibly be known by human reason or reached by man's activity; 
the only hope for man lies in God's plan of salvation, and man 
must trust in this or fall into utter destruction-as apparently 
he is doing. The "crisis" in a man's life appears when God speaks 
to him ; and this is not a communicable experience. 
Criterion, n. The ground or standard for measuring or judging 
the quality or value of anything, especially concerning its truth, 
goodness, or beauty. 
Deduction, n. Loosely used for inference by reasoning from the 
general or universal to the particular. In logic, more strictly 
used for the process of inference by which the mind passes from 
17. 
one or from two propositions to a conclusion which is contained 
in the form of the given proposition or in that of two proposi-
tions taken together. Such deduction depends entirely upon the 
logical form of propositions without regard to the truth or falsity 
of their content. See induction and inference. 
Definition, n. The process of fixing the precise meaning of a 
word by describing it in terms of its agreement and/ or disagree-
ment with other words which are better known or easier to 
understand. While there are several kinds of definition in logic, 
notably nominal, synonymous, denotative, real, and demonstr~-
tive, the essence of all definition is the deliminating of the less 
known by the better known. As such, it is clear that the process 
of definition must be eventually circular, and that this means 
that certain fundamental words must be taken as ultimate in 
experience or else be defined by words for which they are them-
selves the definition. Certainfy a few words, such as "life", 
"consciousness", "moral goodness", and so on are properly 
unique, and, as such, are not subject to definition, since all defini-
tion involves the description of the thing defined in terms of 
something else. See "consciousnesl' as an example. 
Nominal definition is the announcement of an arbitrary decision 
as to 'the sense or way in which a term is used or to be used ; ex. 
the definition of many technical words. 
Denotative definition attempts to fix the meaning of a word by 
stating or indicating examples or specimens of objects for which 
it is the name. 
Synonymous definition states that another term, better known or 
more easily understood than the term under consideration, has 
the same meaning as the word to be defined. 
Real definition attempts to state the essential character of a thing. 
As such, real definition is true or false, and serves for further 
knowledge of the thing. 
Demonstrative definition gives the meaning of a word by directly 
pointing to an instance or specimen of that which is symbolized 
by the word. Logically this is probably the primary type of defini-
tion and is probably the only way in which indefinable words can 
be indirectly defined ! 
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Deism, n. Belief in the existence of God as the creator and law-
giver of the world, which now runs according to these strict 
laws without God's interference or His immediate relation with 
the world. This belief is held on the (supposed) testimony of 
reason, but with the complete rejection of revelation, etc. A 
combination of the so-called "watch-maker" and "absentee land-
lord" view of the world and God. 
Denotation, n. The logical property of a symbol as pointing to, 
standing for, or designating any and all instances, etc., for which 
the symbol is a name. See connotation. 
Determinism, n. In cosmology the theory that all facts and even.ts 
in the universe are absolutely dependent upon a necessary chain 
of causation; universal causality, usually physical causality. 
More narrowly, and also as following from this metaphysical 
determinism, it is used as opposed to free-will; the theory that 
human action and conduct is in no sense free but is entirely the 
result of causes. 
"With earth's first clay they did the last man's knead, 
And then of the last harvest sowed the seed; 
Yes, the first morning of creation wrote 
What the last dawn of reckoning shall read." 
Dialectic, n. Used by Plato as meaning thoughtful discussion, and 
hence as the science or critical evaluation of first principles; as 
such it is the highest, most ultimate form of knowledge. In 
modern philosophy it has two special meanings as used by Kant 
and Hegel. 
Dichotomy, n. The division of a whole into two parts. In logic, 
the division of a class into two lower, mutually exclusive classes, 
ex. the division of the class "corporeal substance" into "animate" 
and "non-animate". Sometimes used for the view that man is 
composed of two parts, soul and body. 
Difference, n. In logical classification, the property or attribute 
( differentia) which we give a species to distinguish it from other 
species of. the same genus. 
Disjunctive, a. In logic a proposition of the form "Either A or 
B but not both" or "Either A or B and perhaps both". 
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Distribution ( of terms). In Aristotelian logic a term is said to be 
distributed when it applies to each and all of the members which 
it stands for or denotes; if the term is indefinite in its application 
it is said to be undistributed. The distribution of terms is of the 
greatest importance because it determines just what is said or 
asserted in the form of the proposition. In the four traditional 
propositional forms, A, E, I, and 0, the subject term of all 
universals and the predicate term of all negatives are distributed, · 
while the subject term of all particulars and the predicate term 
of all affirmatives are undistributed. 
Dualism, n. The theory ( ontological) that Reality is of two kinds, 
spirit and matter, irreducible one to the other. In its widest 
sense, it is used for any theory in any field of investigation which 
asserts that there are two mutually irreducible principles, etc., 
for that field; ex. mind and body, form and matter, God and 
the devil, Good and Evil, male and female, etc.; a material-
spiritual dualism is generally considered requisite to any religion. 
Eclecticism, n. A philosophy made up of ideas .and theories bor-
rowed from various philosophies ; the philosophy held by one who 
selects such doctrines as happen to please him from other schools 
and men without regard to their logic and consistency as a whole; 
a philosophic hash. 
Effect, n. The result or consequence of a cause. See causality and 
cause. "Everything in nature is a cause from which there flows 
some effect." Spinoza. 
Ego, n. The self; the conscious subject; the thinker as opposed 
to the non-ego or object in experience. 
Egoism, n. In ethics, the theory which considers all men to be 
purely self-regarding in character and conduct and which de-
fines the good in terms of self-interest; a theory of systematic 
selfishness; opposed to altruism which defines the good wholly 
in terms of other-regarding motives and interests. 
Emergent evolution, n. An essentially naturalistic interpretation 
of evolution which replaces the older theory of gradual develop-
ment in many small steps of increasing complexity from the 
inorganic to the organic, to mind, and to consciousness, as held 
by Darwin, Spencer, etc., by the conception of the abrupt appear-
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ance of "novelty" in successive stages of development whenever 
the preceding stage has reached a sufficient degree of complexity 
( S. Alexander, etc.) ; although each "higher" stage is unpredict-
able on the level of the preceding stage, and is irreducible to it, 
nevertheless each higher stage has its causal ground in the in-
creased (physical) complexity of the lower as brought about by 
the physical nature of the process of evolution itself. 
Empiricism, n. The theory in epistemology that all knowledge 
without exception comes from sense-experience; it flatly denies 
the a priori entirely, asserting that all knowledge is gained a 
posteriori. 
Empiricat a. Used in philosophy for sense knowledge, or for 
sense evidence put forward in support of some claim or con-
clusion. In science it is also used in a narrower way to signify 
impartial observation of fact, etc., i.e. empirical evidence 1s 
impartially observed evidence. 
End, n. The goal for the attainment of which a human agent 
strives or acts; object of intention; purpose. Although commonly 
used in philosophy in terms of human action, it is involved in all 
processes. It is a teleological term, carrying with it the idea of 
value or worth in the goal or termination of the process. In its 
ordinary use as limit or temporal termination, "end" does not 
have this idea of value. "No man ever undertakes an art or a 
science merely to acquire knowledge of it. In all human affairs 
there is always an end in view- ... " Polybius. 
Energism, n. The naturalistic doctrine which considers "matter" 
to be a form of energy, rather than ultimate, irreducible units 
of stuff. See materialism. 
Entelechy ~ n. Used by Aristotle for the teleological principle of 
organization and direction, constituting the essential reality of 
all organic process as a life-history, and, in a wider sense, for 
the inherent nature of Reality as Becoming. 
Used also by Driesch and other vita/is ts for the "life principle" 
which distinguishes all living things from the merely inorganic. 
Entity, n. A particular being; a real existence; the existence of a 
real particular as such apart from its qualities and/ or relations. 
21. 
Sometimes used to designate that which is common to all mem-
bers of a species or genus apart from the individual characteristics 
of the members; sometimes also loosely used to designate that 
which makes a thing what it is, i.e. vaguely as its essential 
nature. 
Epistemology, n. The . branch of philosophy which critically 
studies the nature, ways, and limitations of (human) knowing; 
more loosely synonymous with "d1eory of knowledge". 
Equal, a. and n. The same in ~uantity and/ or quality. 
EqualitJ', n. Used in political philosophy and the social sciences 
for the doctrine that all men are equal--sometimes taken liter-
ally to mean equal in ability and worth, as when science denies 
the equality of men; more traditionally taken to mean that all 
men are equally men, as, in the Declaration of Independence, all 
men are created free and equal; every man to count as one and 
no man to count for more than one; equal in the eyes of the law, 
and so on. 
Essence, n. Broadly used for the ultimate character of a thing; 
that which makes it what it is, in c;ontrast to its qualities or other 
properties which may change at different times, etc. Contrasted 
with existence. 
Eternal, a. Sometimes carelessly used as endless; that which has 
always and / or will always exist. 1\.-fore properly used for that 
which is outside time; timeless in the sense of not being subject 
to time sequence. 
Eternity, n. The timeless; an infinite extent of time; everlast-
ingness. cf. J. S. MacKenzie-"Eternity", Enc. of R. & E., V. 5. 
Ethics, n. The branch of philosophy which is concerned with the 
study of right cond~ct. Traditionally one of the three normative 
sciences, it is concerned with the critical discovery of the good life 
for man in terms of a standard of value and its application to 
practical human living. As such, ethics involves the two funda-
mental questi~ns of all conduct, What constitutes human good? 
and What ought I as a human being to do? "Ethics is the art 
of living_ well and happily." Henry More . 
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Event, n. Something happening in space and time; any occurrence 
or happening. "The gravest events dawn with no more noise than 
the morning star makes in rising." H. W. Beecher. 
Evaluation, n. The critical determination or appraisal of worth 
in terms of some ( implicitly recognized, at least) predetermined 
standard or norm. See value. 
Evil, a. and n. That which ought-not-to-be; the positive absence 
of good; physically harmful or morally bad. "Be not overcome 
· of evil, but overcome evil with good." Romans VI, 34. "The 
three evils are the sea, fire, and woman." Greek Proverb. 
Existence, n. That which has matter and form (Aristotle) ; that 
which has spacial and temporal being, whether or not actually 
experienced, or even beyond direct experience, ex. a given tree 
"exists" and so also does the "other side" of the moon. Existence 
should be distinguished from reality., i.e. existing vs. being real. 
Things exist in space and time, but logical properties, universal 
truths, Platonic ideas, God, and so on, do not. They are in no 
place and do not endure in time. They are, or may be, "real", 
but they do not "exist". "There is nothing in the essence of 
man which makes his existence necessary; it may equally well 
happen that this or that man does not exist." Spinoza. Contrasted 
with essence. 
Existential philosophy. The name given to the doctrine of Kierke-
gaard, Heidegger, etc., that there is no natural phenomenon other 
than that which has its existence ih psychological states; knowl-
edge, both in its source and in its elements, is constituted by 
sensations existing in the mind, and is judged, not in terms of 
truth, but according to biological value when the sense-data of 
consciousness is purified of all emotion, wish, prejudice, etc. 
Exp·edient, a. and n. That which is advantageous to the fulfilment 
of given desires or interests . .It has a narrower usage than the 
idea implied in the saying that the end justifies the means, since 
"expedient" itself implies a certain sort of end, namely given 
desires or interests under present circumstances and conditions, 
whatever they may be; distinguished from consideration of the 
right and the just. 
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Expediency, n. The doctrine of "social ethics" that human 
affairs develop and proceed according to given desires and inter-
ests in men in relation to each other and to their environment. 
See humanism. 
Experience, n. The condition or state of immediate awareness of 
something going on; the fact or realization of being the subject 
of a dynamic condition of affairs or of being affected by events; 
in general, "experience" carries with it the idea of consciously 
being a subject and emphasizes the dynamic or temporal charac-
ter of awareness and/ or of affective events, thus distinguishing it 
from consciousness as such. There is no uniform usage of the 
term, however, since its definition depends upon a theoretical 
interpretation in which philosophers differ. Thus, F. H. Bradley 
considered experience to be identical with consciousness, while 
William James accepted it as immediately given awareness 
without the implication of being consciously "subject", or indi-
cating an object for that matter-i.e. a "neutral phenomenon"; 
John Dewey makes "experience" central in his philosophy, and 
apparently he considers experience to be neither purely subjec-
tive nor objective, but rather a relation between the living 
organism and its environment as a process of interaction between 
an active, purposively selective, and inquiring mind and the 
world of fact as intentionally investigated and expediently used. 
"Experience" is also used in the following distinguishable ways: 
as an extreme form of empiricism in which it is identified with 
mere sense-impressions; as a fund or store of knowledge, either of 
an individual or of men or of the race; as the world of empirical 
fact to which science resorts in observation ; etc. 
Experiment, n. Observation under controlled conditions which 
have been deliberately set up for a given purpose or problem 
of investigation or verification. "Experimental method" is often 
loosely used to signify dependence on empirical evidence only. 
Explicit, a. That which is clearly and definitely stated or recog-
nized; expressing all that is intended or meant, leaving nothing 
which is merely implied and not expressly asserted or recognized. 
Extension ( of terms). In logic, generally synonymous with deno-
tation . 
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Externality, a. (of relations) n. The doctrine that a term or 
thing is what it is apart from its relations to other things, etc. 
Terms are independent of their relations, so that when their 
relations change, or are changed, they are not modified by such 
change in relations; a certain relation between X and Y such 
that if it is removed X and Y remain the same; ex. remove 
an apple from a box of apples, place it in new relations on the 
kitchen table, and, providing you do not eat it or prepare it for 
a pie, etc., the apple remains unchanged by the change in its 
relations; John Doe, single or married, remains the same old 
John Doe. Opposed to the internality of relations. 
Fact, n. That which is real or exists in any given universe of 
discourse. That is, the simple question, what facts do you know, 
is meaningless until you add what the facts are to be about; 
so also is the command to go out and find or observe some facts 
until you are told what sort of facts for which you are to look. 
In other words, fact is not synonymous with the real and existing, 
but designates the real and existing which has b'een singled out 
or noticed ( and probably put in the form of a proposition), 
through some interest or intention. More loosely used to signify 
any actual instance or occurrence or "brute" event; that which 
simply is without regard to value and in contrast to that which 
is necessarily, or that which is merely possible. "Facts are stub-
born things." T. Smollett. "A fact in itself is nothing. It is 
valuable only for the idea attached to it, or for the proof which 
it furnishes." Claude Bernard. 
Faith, n. The personal acceptance of something as true without 
adequate empirical evidence or reasoned proof, as in the Scholas-
tic principle of faith beyond reason but not contrary to reaso~. 
As in the word "belief", "faith" has a qualitative implication of 
fundamental trust and personal certainty, especially in the face 
of the theoretically indemonstrable-"believing where we can-
not prove." Used primarily for belief in theological interpreta-
tions. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence 
of things not seen." Hebrews, XI, 1, c. 65. 
Fallacy, n. Used in logic for any flaw, unsound step, or process 
in reasoning, either "formal" or "material"; in formal logic, 
any invalid form of inference. 
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False, a. A statement or proposition which does not agree with, 
or state, the real or existing; erroneous, contrary to fact, prin-
ciple, or law. 
Fatalism, ·n. The deterministic doctrine that everything happens 
according to a blind necessity, personified as Fate; sometimes 
used for the theological theory that all human activities and 
events are preordained by God. See determinism. "Fate leads 
the willing, and drags along those who hang back." Seneca. 
Final Cause, n. The end, purpose, or goal for which, in the sense 
of "because of which", an action or event takes place. The 
doctrine of final causes is the teleological theory that all things 
and events are to be explained in terms of some end or purpose, 
value or good, to which they are instrumental and by which they 
are justified. Comparable to the principle of sufficient reason. 
See cause and sufficient reason. 
Form., n. In Aristotle, the intelligible structure or essence which 
makes a thing or being what it is. as distinguished from its 
matter which embodies this structure or essence, i.e. its formal 
cause; Aristotle distinguished four "causes" of things, the ma-
terial cause as that of which a thing is made, the efficient cause 
by which it comes into being, the formal cause as the struc-
ture or essense of what it is, and the final cause as its end 
or that for which it exists-in natural objects, in contrast 
to man-made products, the last three causes really coincide, thus 
reducing all existent things to two ultimate principles, namely 
matter and form. But this does not result in an irreducible 
duality of principle, for all matter possesses the capacity for 
form and is thus potentially the formed-matter, and equally 
form has actuality only in its succession of embodiments in 
matter. For example, in the total human personality the soul 
is not something different in kind or other than the body, but 
is the very form (structure, essence) of the body. Formed 
matter may in turn be matter for an additional form, cf. subject-
matter and form of a poem. In Scholasticism, the determining 
principle of a thing which combines with prime matter to make 
it what it is, as a given species or kind of thing. 
In Kant, the ways in which the active mind organizes the stuff 
of experience in being received, making experience possible at 
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all; Kant distinguishes between knowledge gained from experi-
ence such as our ideas of stones, trees, men, mice, etc., and the 
knowledge which does not come from but which constitutes 
experience, i.e. which makes experience possible, and which is 
the product of the mind's own activity-this a priori knowledge 
consists in the categories or forms of experience, which are of 
necessity valid universally for all experience but which cannot 
be applied beyond experience to the things-in-themselves. 
In art, the expressive organization of the "matter" of a work 
of art, as distinguished from both its matter and its content. 
While all objects of perception have "form" and individual 
uniqueness, artistic form is always the instrument or means of 
expressing something, the content or substance, which it does 
through the particular organization of the matter, the medium 
which is used. 
In logic, the structural properties of propositions and the rela-
tions between propositions, without any regard for their content 
or subject-matter. See inference, logic, validity, etc. 
Formalism, n. In ethics, the theory that acts are inherently right 
or wrong as an absolute quality of the act itself without regard 
to its consequences or the end which it may achieve ·; the good 
lies in the fulfilment of duty, and duty is determined by purely 
formal principles ( Kant's rational will, etc.). 
Free-will, n. This is an ambiguous term which stands for two 
doctrines of the will, namely indeterminism and self-determina-
tion. The first is the doctrine that the will can act from no cause 
or reason whatsoever; it is entirely undetermined. The second 
is the doctrine that the will is determined by the essential char-
acter of the self independently of all external causes-the free-
dom of rationally self-determined choice rather than physical 
or external compulsion. Opposed to determination. Bergson holds 
that the will is free because the alternatives between which the 
will chooses are not pre-existent, but are created as novel pos-
sibilities by the life-process. Thus, the choice is harmonious with 
the prior self but not determined completely by it, or completely 
arbitrary. 
Free, a. and Freedom, n. are used in the above sense as free-will. 
More loosely, they are used for the individual's relation to his 
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fellows in society and the state as being unrestricted in his per-
sonal initiative and activity; usually in terms of degree, or of 
spheres of unrestricted activity vs. those ·of socially controlled 
or governmentally regulated activity. 
Function, n. The activity which is proper to the nature of any-
thing ; the activity by which a thing fulfils its nature or purpose. 
Used in logic to designate a regular relation between two or 
more processes of change ; any event so related to another as 
to vary in some determinate way with the other-either one then 
being said to be a function of the other. 
Fundamental, a. Essential . or ultimate; basic, serving as the 
primary ground or foundation. 
General (term). In logic, a general term is one which denotes any 
and all objects of a class of similar objects, ex. metal, horse, 
mouse, man; distinguished from a collective term which denotes 
a number of things jointly, or joined together as a whole, ex. 
crew, regiment, jury 1 etc. 
Generalization, n. The process of forming general notions or 
propositions on the basis of individuals or particular instances; 
the process of passing from a statement which is true for some 
observed instances to a statement purporting to be true for all 
possible instances of that class. The great danger in all generali-
zation is the tendency to suppose that that which apparently 
characterizes the observed instances of a class is necessarily true 
for all the possible members or instances of the class. "Men are 
more apt to be mistaken in their generalizations than in their 
particular observations," N. Machiavelli. 
Genus, n. (plural, genera). A class which has other classes as its 
members; a class whose members are other classes. Used with 
species (plural, species) which is a class which is a member of 
another class or genus. 
Good, a. and n. As an adjective it stands for having the right 
qualities to be adequate to or satisfactory for something. In 
ethics it denotes a motive, action, end, or agent which is morally 
right or of worth; having the ethical quality of goodness. As a 
noun it designates a norm of positive value, ~ltimatc, intrinsic 
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value, or an instrumental value which derives its worth from that 
of the end or purpose which it serves. "Good has two meanings; it 
means both that which is good absolutely and that which is good 
for somebody." Aristotle. "Some things must be good in them-
selves, else there could be no measure whereby to lay out good 
and evil." Benj. Whichcote. 
Goodness, n. In ethics, loosely used as synonymous with virtue or 
moral excellence. 
More strictly used in axiology to designate a unique quality 
which as such cannot be defined. In the case of moral goodness 
the conditions under which it makes its appearance can be more 
or less defined, but the term itself stands for a quality whose 
essence can be apprehended only through immediate, personal 
experience. One of the three great, traditionally ultimate tnd 
intrinsic values-truth, goodness, and beauty. "If I am asked, 
'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the 
end of the matter. Or if I am asked, 'How is good to be defined?' 
my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to 
say about it." G. E. Moore. 
Hedonism, n. In ethics, the teleological theory that pleasure, or a 
pleasurable state of consciousness, constitutes the good and proper 
end of action. 
In egoistic hedonism it is my pleasure that I seek, while in 
universalistic hedonism it is the greatest pleasure of the greatest 
number which I seek, supposedly, or ought to seek ( Sidgwick), 
or be made to seek through the social (majority) imposition of 
artificial pains and pleasures (Bentham). 
Psychological hedonism is the theory that human motivation is 
exclusively found in the desire for pleasure and the avoidance 
of pain. 
Hedonistic paradox. The doctrine or experienced conclusion that 
the surest way to defeat pleasure is to seek it. "Follow pleasure, 
and then will pleasure flee .... " John Haywood. 
Heterogeneous, a. Dissimilar; different in kind or nature. Op-
posed to homogeneous. 
Homogeneous, a. Similar; uniformity of kind or n3:ture. Opposed 
to heterogeneous. 
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three, in terms of man's experienced desires, needs, and interests, 
usually in terms of society. See pragmatism, instrumentalism, 
expediency. In "religion," the worship of humanity or society in 
place of God in primary concern with so-called "social justice", 
and so on. Hum an ism is also used loosely by some authors to 
indicate an opposition to science, or even to romanticism, but 
more usually it is used as associated with naturalism and opposed 
to supernaturalism, and hence as akin to science. 
Hypothesis, n. A possible solution which is conceived for a prob-
lem and which is tentatively accepted until verified or rejected; 
the scientific method of hypothesis (method of hypothesis, deduc-
tion, and verification) is to assume as possibly true something 
which cannot be observed, to reason from its consequences which 
are observable and true if it is true, and then to try to verify 
these consequences, finally concluding as to the probability that 
the hypothesis is indeed true. More loosely used to designate 
any assumption, or anything assumed to be true without ade-
quate evidence or demonstration. In logic; the antecedent in a 
conditional proposition. 
Hypothetical, a. Used in logic to designate a propos1t1on which 
states the dependence of something upon something else, usually 
in the form "if something, then something else." See conditional 
proposition. 
Idea, n. Loosely used as synonymous with thought; notion con-
ceived by the mind; plan, or plan of action, as something to be 
aimed at or created. 
Used in a more specialized sense by various philosophers, for 
whose usage their own definitions should be studied and carefully 
distinguished. Exs. : Plato-an eternally real pattern or norma-
tive universal of which the individual members of any class are 
imperfect copies or embodiment; Kant-a conception of reason 
which transcends all sense-experience ; Hegel-the Concrete 
Universal as realized in a finite mind ; Schopenhauer-the actual 
objects and individuals in which the Will embodies itself or is 
self-expressed ; Locke-whatever it is which the mind can be 
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employed about in thinking; Berkeley-any immediate experi-
ence, using it to cover all experience so that our more modern 
word "sense-datum" may be substituted for it; Hume-a 
memory-image; etc. "The wise only possess ideas; the greater 
part of mankind are possessed by them." S. T. Coleridge. cf. 
C. C. J. Webb-"Idea", Enc. of R. &. E., V. 7. 
Idealism, n. ( 1) Used to designate a metaphysical system which 
holds that reality is of the nature of mind; nothing which is 
finally real is independent of mind. Such metaphysical idealism 
may be absolute, or monistic ( one great mind), or pluralistic 
and/ or personalistic (many minds, usually one great mind and 
many finite minds-theistic). Opposed to realism in the modern 
sense. See realism. ( 2) Also used to designate a metaphysical 
system which stresses the primacy of values as being not wholly 
of human, or sub-human, origin but in some sense objective in 
reality. Opposed to naturalism which holds values to be mere 
addenda to existence, mere names for the favorable or unfavor-
able ways in which events affect man. See naturalism, persona/ism. 
While many idealists are so in both senses of the term, this is 
not necessary, as, for example, it is doubtful that Plato, who is 
an idealist in this second sense, is so in the first. 
Epistemological idealism is the first form of idealism approached 
from arguments about knowing. 
Identity, n. Absolute sameness; one to one correspondence in all 
respects; the relation of a thing to itself. One of the logical 
laws of thought, traditionally stated "A is A" or if anything is 
A it is A, or if any proposition is true it is true. Also used for the 
problem and principle of personal identity, as the existence of the 
self or a continuity of individuality. cf. A. E. Taylor-"Iden-
tity", Enc. of R. & E., V. 7. 
Immanence, n. Used to designate the being of God as, in his 
mode of activity, within the world, or, if wholly immanent, as 
identical with the world. Contrasted with transcendence. See 
theism and pantheism. Used by the Scholastics to signify a cause 
or an act which is entirely within the mind of the agent and 
which produces no external effects. Indwelling; actually present 
in, etc. "A cognition is an immanent act of mind." Sir Wm. 
Hamilton. 
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Immediate., a. Direct; first-hand; not through any intervening 
medium. 
Immediate experience-direct, personal experience; contrasted 
• with representation and all forms of inferential or "mediated" 
or interpreted knowledge; directly present in the mind. 
Immediate inference-passing from one proposition directly to 
another contained in it, on the basis of the formal properties of 
the first, without the use of a middle term. 
Implicit., a. Implied., but not directly stated or clearly recognized; 
naturally or logically involved or contained in something else 
but not clearly expressed. 
Imply., v. In logic, a proposition, or propositions taken together, 
or particular evidence, containing or implicitly stating, some 
other proposition, or propositions, are said to "imply" the "new" 
proposition or propositions, and these, in turn, are said to be 
"implied' by the original or accepted proposition, etc., which 
contains them; such "implied" propositions are rendered explicit 
by inference; also the relation holding between the antecedent 
and the consequence of a conditional proposition, symbolized as 
p) q, etc. See inference. 
Inconsistency., n. In general, lack of accord or of agreement within 
or between supposedly related forms, ideas, actions, beliefs, propo-
sitions, etc.; a process of reasoning such that the thoughts or 
propositions involved do not "make sense" when asserted to-
gether, i.e. which lead ultimately, if not directly, to contradic-
tion; more strictly, in logic, a system of propositions which con-
tain a proposition such that its affirmation and also its negation., 
or denial, are implied in them. 
Indeterminism., n. The theory that events happen withou causal 
connections. See determinism and free-will. 
Individual., a. and n. Particular object or person; single member 
of a class. The problem as to what constitutes an individual is 
one of the oldest and most difficult philosophic problems, usually 
referred to as the problem or principle of individuation. For 
this, it is sometimes considered that space and time location con-
stitute inanimate individuality, that a life-history constitutes the 
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animate, and that a conscious, rational continuity constitutes 
human individuality. 
Individualism., n. The theory that man is an independent indi-
vidual, having his own separate desires, needs, and interests prior 
to or apart from membership in society. This view of the nature 
of man often results in an egoistic ethics, a political philosophy 
that the state exists simply for the benefit of individuals in their 
self-interest, and in a political economy of laissez faire competi-
tion. More loosely, the good of the individual is the standard 
for state action. 
Induction., n. The process by which the mind passes from the 
particular to the general ; proceeding from the observation of 
particular instances, or from propositions true of some instances, 
to a single statement, or smaller number of propositions, which 
cover all the observed instances or propositions in question. "Per-
fect induction" is such a general assertion for a group of particu-
lars based upon the examination of each one of them; "imper-
fect induction" is such an assertion for all members of a class 
based upon an examination of only some of them, and is thus 
merely probable, more or less so depending upon the selection of 
the samples for examination, etc. See g_eneralization and deduc-
tion. 
Inequality., n. Used in political philosophy and the social sciences 
for the doctrine that men are not by nature equal in ability 
and/or worth, as science denies the inherited or literal equality 
of men; any condition ( skill, strength, intelligence, wealth) of 
superiority or inferiority in relation to other men; any social 
system which does not provide the same "opportunities" for all 
men; for Plato, the idea of equality for unequals-"equality" 
being inequality for unequals. See equality. 
Infer, v. To derive conclusions or other propositions by deduction 
or induction from evidence or propositions, true or assumed to be 
true, which contain or imply., them. See imply and inference. 
Inference., n. In logic, the process of reasoning, either inductively 
or deductively, from evide~ce or propositions assumed to be true 
to conclusions or other propositions whose derived truth depends 
upon the accepted evidence or propositions. In Aristotelian for-
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mal logic, the derivation of one proposition from another upon 
the basis of its formal properties. There are two kinds of such 
formal inference: immediate inference which is passing directly 
from one proposition to another, and mediate inference which is 
passing from one proposition to · another by means of a third, 
through a middle term which links them together. See deduc-
tion, induction, generalization. 
Infinite, a. and n. Boundless; without limit; a series of terms 
such that after any given term there is a term. The mathematical 
infinite is any class which can be put in one-one correspondence 
with a part of itself ( which does not contain some member of 
the whole), eg. for every number there is an even number which 
is twice it, so the number of the numbers is infinite. The prob-
lem and theory of the infinite is another of the puzzling subjects 
in philosophy. cf. J. S. Mackenzie-"Infinity", Enc. of R. & E., 
V. 7. 
Innate ideas, n. A priori principles and modes of the mind which 
all men as human and rational beings possess from birth ( Des-
cartes). Opposed to epistemological empiricism. ( Locke, etc.). 
Instrumental (values). Values which derive their worth from 
some end, purpose, or other value which they serve. Contrasted 
with intrinsic. See good and value. 
lnstrumentalism, n. John Dewey's (and others') form of Prag-
matism. See also expediency, and humanism. 
Intension ( of terms), n. Synonymous with connotation. 
Interaction, n. The doctrine of dualism that mind and body 
mutually affect each other, eg. when I will to do anything my 
body executes my will, and when my body experiences things it 
influences my mind to be aware of them, etc. 
I nternality ( of relations), n. The doctrine that the relations of 
a thing or person constitute part of its reality; a relation between 
X and Y is internal if when it is removed X and/or Y are 
modified to X' and/or Y'; exs. a hand cut off from the body is no 
longer a "hand" (Aristotle) ; John Doe when he marries is no 
longer simply the same old John Doe that he was unmarried. 
In ethics and politics the recognition, following Aristotle, etc., 
.34 
that a man is a man in his higher fulfilment only in terms of 
his social relations, love of wife and children, friends, country-
men, etc. Opposed to externality of relations. 
Intrinsic (value). A value which is a worth in itself; which does 
not derive its worth from any other value. 
Intuition, n. Immediate insight, or the direct apprehension of 
truth without the mediation or processes of reason; the self, 
other minds, the external world, and ultimate values are typically 
considered as directly apprehended in this way. 
lntuitionism, n. The theory that truth or some truth is only per-
ceived or known by intuition without reasoning. 
Irrational ism, n. Any system of philosophy which ignores or 
denies rational principles, such as that of Schopenhauer or 
Nietzsche, both of which assert reality to be blind, ceaselessly 
striving force; any doctrine of philosophical romanticism which 
asserts the primacy of will and the subordination of reason as 
at most the mere instrumental slave of the passions. See volun-
tarism. 
Irrelevant, a. That upon which the true or correct solution of a 
problem or issue does not depend. Failure first to distinguish 
the relevant and irrelevant sort of information which one must 
have to reach a valid conclusion is one of the gi:eatest sources 
of error in all investigation and reflection. 
Judgment, n. Traditionally understood as the assertion (affirma-
tion or denial) of a predicate of a subject; in modern usage 
broadened out to include the affirmation or denial of a relation 
between terms. As such, a judgment makes a claim to truth, and 
is thus either true or false. In this usage "judgment" is made 
almost synonymous with "proposition". Also, and more properly, 
used to designate that which is asserted in a proposition as a 
belief in some mind. As such, judgments are distinguished into 
judgments of fact and judgments of value. 
Critical discernment; forming conclusions as to the truth of a 
proposition, etc.; evaluation of worths, etc. "Men judge the 
affairs of other men bett~r than their own." Terence. 
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Justice, n. Traditionally one of the four cardinal virtues, the 
other three being temperance, courage, and wisdom ; for Plato, 
however, justice is the whole of virtue itself rather than a particu-
lar virtue, since it designates the proper proportional fulfilment 
and right recognition of all aspects and activities of life as ex-
pressed in the other three virtues; in line with this interpreta-
tion, justice is sometimes used to signify moral righteousness, 
both as a quality of the agent and as a principle of conduct in 
relation to others. While Aristotle has a similar view of justice 
as lawfulness or righteousness as the rational principle of all 
virtue in social relations, he also distinguished justice as fairness 
in two senses, distributive and retributive, and these are now the 
more common usages of the term; distributive justice is giving 
to each man his fair share of "goods" or "advantages" according 
to his deserts ( see inequality) ; retributive justice is the impartial 
and impersonal restitution of this fairness where it has been 
upset by a wrong-doer gaining more than his fair share from a 
victim. 
Know, v. and Knowledge, n. These two words, the verb and the 
noun, constitute one of the most difficult problems in philosophy 
and the central subject-matter of epistemology. They are not 
subject to a short definition. In general, however, knowing and 
knowledge are of two sorts: having direct acquaintance with, 
as when we "know" we have a pain or "know" the color blue; 
and having information about, as when we form a conception of 
a thing, its function, or its nature. The first is a matter, or rela-
tion of immediate experience, while the second is less direct, 
more inferential, conceptual, etc. Both are, however, related to 
each other, and both can be defined only in terms of conditions, 
processes of verification, etc. "When you know a thing, to hold 
that you know it, and when you do not know it, to admit that 
you do not-this is true knowledge." Confucius. 
Language, n. A system of symbols, usually words as spoken or 
written, such that a mind can communicate with another mind. 
Language is a remarkable intellectual instrument which alone 
enables man to get outside of himself. Without language all 
feeling, all observation, etc. would remain purely personal, pri-
vate or subjective, and no common world of activity, interest, or 
communion would be possible . 
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Law, n. "Every formula which expresses the necessity of an 
action." (Kant). 
Human law is a prescnpt1ve rule, either formally enacted or 
developed by custom, which is generally recognized in a com-
munity as binding and usually carrying with it some penalty or 
other means of enforcement. 
Natural law is a descriptive statement of observed uniformities 
of behavior, which have been so well verified as to permit of 
little doubt. In "scientific method" hypothesis, natural law, and 
axiom are ,dl alike in their descriptive character, differing only 
in degree of verification and certainty. 
Liberty, n. Freedom from external restraints of human prescrip-
tion or control-not to be confused with indeterminacy as free-
dom from causal connections or the freedom of the will. See free-
will. 
Licence, n. The excessive abuse of liberty in disregarding accepted 
ethical rules or moral customs. Following Aristotle there is a 
distinction between the licentious man and the incontinent man 
in that the licentious man has no conflict between his physical 
desires and rational choice whereas the incontinent man suffers 
such a conflict although he is overcome by his physical (carnal) 
desires. "What is called liberty in some is called license in 
others." Quintilian. 
Life, n. Probably an ultimate term which, like consciousness, 
rationality, moral goodness, cannot be defined as such, but only 
the manifestations, actions and functions, etc., of life, as, for 
example, when life is defined as the sum of the properties of an 
organism, such as irritability, reproduction, growth by assimi-
lation of food, adaptation or self-adjustment to the environment, 
self-protection, self-maintenance, self-repair, self-direction, and 
the overcoming of obstacles, etc. 
Logic, n. The normative science of correct and valid thinking. 
Formal logic is the study or science of the formal properties of 
propositions, and of their relations leading to valid inferences. 
Logos, n. Cosmic reason ( the philosopher's God) ; cosmic 
rationality giving order and intelligibility, in terms of value and 
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perfection, to all things and events; the world-reason (nous), 
purposively ordering and directing all things toward the good 
( Heraclitus, Plato, the Stoics, Royce, etc.). In Christian theol-
ogy it is translated as the "Word" and is used to designate the 
second person of the Trinity. 
Materialism, n. The metaphysical theory that the reality of the 
whole universe, including man, reduce to matter in motion; 
reality is of one kind, namely matter in motion. See naturalism. 
Matter, n. Loosely used for the substance or permianent stuff of 
all possible physical things; defined in terms of its characteristics, 
such as extension, mass, weight, motion, occupancy of space, 
location in space and/ or time, inertia, etc. ; that which is outside 
the mind and which causes sense-perceptions by which we gain 
knowledge of the external physical world. For Democritus it 
is ultimate, indestructible atoms of stuff in motion ; for Plato, 
the unformed substratum of the physical world ; for Aristotle, 
that from which a process of change or development starts; for 
Descartes, "extended substance", inert, without power of spon-
taneous motion, and entirely subject to mechanical laws; for 
Spinoza, one aspect, or mode of expression, in terms of exten-
sion, of the one ultimate reality or substance; for Locke, an 
unknowable somewhat as that which supports the properties 
which we sense in our sense-impressions and which causes our 
sense-experience of them; but in modern (scientific) theory, the 
fixed difference between matter and energy has been dissolved, 
so that now matter is apparently not to be defined in itself but has 
become a useful abstraction, to designate not what matter 1s m 
itself but simply what it does. See mind. 
Meaning, n. The functional character and formal properties of 
symbols in intelligible communication. Symbols have meaning, 
while objects and our ideas of them are signs of something rather 
than having meaning in themselves, ex. when we say, The clouds 
mean rain, the symbols in their formal relationship have a 
meaning, while the clouds and our ideas of them, based upon 
past experience, are a sign of rain. In general, meaning redu<:es to 
the process of saying something intelligible in communication, 
but the problem of meaning is again one of the most difficult and 
complex of philosophic subjects. Meaning is often more loosely 
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used in the sense of intention or purpose, or for expressive or 
significant in terms of purpose or value, ex. a meaningful exist-
ence is one which has point or worth, or conversely, a life has 
no meaning if it is pointless in its lack of value or purpose. 
Measure, n. The quantity of anything stated in comparison to 
something else, ordinarily in predefined and fixed, numerical 
units. 
Mechanical, a. Used to designate any naturalistic theory which 
denies that purpose or design have any part in determining the 
happenings of the universe, and which asserts that events auto-
matically occur through their causal connections from the imme-
diate past into the present ( efficient causation exclusively). 
Opposed to all teleological theories, in that all things or events 
are the consequence of matter in motion, to be explained accord-
ing to strict mechanical law. 
Mechanism, n. The doctrine of universal physical causality; as 
applied more narrowly and specifically to life, it is the theory 
that a physico-chemical explanation in deterministic causal terms 
is adequate for all life processes. Opposed to vit~lism. 
Medium, n. Used in arts and aesthetics to designate the materials 
with which a work of art is created, such as paints and canvas, 
musical sounds, etc. 
M eliorism, n. The view that the world can and may be made 
better by human effort. Contrasted with both optimism and 
pessimism. The world is neither all good nor all evil, but a 
mixture of both in which the issues are in doubt and thus sub-
ject to man's own striving for the good (James, etc.). 
M entalism, n. The subjective idealism (.idea-ism) of Berkley, 
etc. The metaphysic~! theory that individual minds and their 
subjective experiences or states . alone are real or constitute 
reality. 
Metaphysics, n. That branch of philosophy which investigates 
and studies the ultimate, essential nature of reality; the investi-
gation and intepretation of the most fundamental, general, and 
lasting of all questions concerning that which Is. In its narrower 
and older sense, metaphysics is synonymous with ontology, as 
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dealing with the kind or kinds of stuff constituting ultimate 
reality. cf. J. S. Mackenzie-"Metaphysics", Enc. of R. & E., 
V. 8. 
Mind,, n. The self,, the subject, defined by its functions of per-
~e1vmg, thinking or reasoning, willing, remembering, feeling, 
imagining, and so on; the sum of the properties of a highly com-
plex living organism, such as sensibility, intelligence, intention-
ally selective choice, memory, and self-consciousness; the whole 
range of conscious and intentional activities; contrasted with 
and/ or opposed to matter. Thus, in metaphysics there are essen-
tially three theories concerning the ontological status of mind 
and matter, ( 1) naturalism,, which reduces mind to matter in 
terms of physical states and functions, (2) idealism,, which. in 
various interpretations absorbs matter into mind, at least as not 
being real independent of mind, and ( 3) dualism,, which con-
siders mind and matter to be irreducible one to the other, and 
and then either (a) asserts them both to be ultimately real, or 
( b) considers them both to be aspects or expressions of some 
underlying, single reality ( Aristotle, Spinoza, etc.). As cos-
mically real, mind, while pervading all finite or individual minds 
as a metaphysical substance, is usually considered as the logos or 
rational principle of the universe ( Heraclitus, the Stoics, etc.), 
or as the absolute, all inclusive reality ( Hegel-the Concrete 
Universal, Royce-the Absolute, etc.). See all . italicized terms. 
cf. J. Royce-"Mind", Enc. of R. & E., V. 8. 
Mon ism,, n. Loosely used for any theory which reduces any field 
of investigation to a single principle. More philosophically, there 
are two sorts of metaphysical monism: ontological monism 
which is the theory that ultimate reality is of one kind-idealism,, 
materialism,, and naturalism are monistic theories in ontology; 
'cosmological monism is the theory that reality is entirely inter-
related to make up a single, complete system of activity, etc.-
most deterministic theories are theories of cosmological monism. 
Ontological monism is opposed to dualism. Cosmological monism 
is opposed to pluralism. Epistemological monism is the theory 
that objects known are directly present to the mind; epistemo-
logical dualism that they are known by means of "ideas" of 
them, which latter are alone directly present to the knower . 
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Morals, n. The accepted or customary rules of right conduct; 
sometimes loosely used as synonymous with ethics. 
Morality, n. The system of such rules, or conduct in accord 
with them. "All the civilized nations of the world agree in the 
great points of morality." Joseph Addison. 
Moral, a. Used to designate conduct in accord with the accepted 
rules of right and wrong; a character virtuous in this way; 
moral sense as the ability to distinguish right and wrong; moral 
philosophy as loosely synonymous with ethics. 
Motion, n. Change of place without change of properties; con-
trasted with generation and becoming which involve change 
of properties. 
Mysticism, n. A type of religion in which the immediate aware-
ness of God and direct individual, personal communion with 
God are central and primary. 
At times mysticism has been interpreted as a religious theory 
that God is beyond all mental knowledge in thought and reason 
but that union with God is possible in ecstatic contemplation, 
achieved by a "via negative" and resulting in ecstasy as an 
"unknowing knowing". 
An intense, essentially aesthetic, absorption in the immediate 
appreciation of the goodness of reality, for which no words of 
description in physical imagery are adequate. 
While mysticism is often associated with all forms of ecstasy, 
abnormal states, esoteric knowledge and spuriously privileged 
communications, such association is loosely uncritical and false. 
The essential core of mysticism, found in various religions, is the 
experience of direct and personal communion with God or Real-
ity-not specific communication, but more a spiritual enjoyment 
in and aesthetic appreciation of Reality as of ultimate worth. cf. 
R. Jones-"Mysticism", Enc. of R. & E., V. 9. 
Naturalism, n. The metaphysical system which holds that nature, 
defined as the sum of physical events occurring in space and time 
according to strict causality, constitutes the whole of reality. 
While idealism starts with the assumption that the universe is 
rational, that there is a reason or purpose why things are as 
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they are and behave as they do, naturalism assumes the universe 
to be self-existing and accepts it and its behavior as merely given. 
Thus, naturalism denies all final causation, purposes, and the 
objectivity of values. It includes man and his human behavior 
simply as part of nature and subject to the same principles which 
hold throughout the physical universe. It considers values to be 
mere names which man adds onto things according to the way in 
which they affect him, and interprets ethical norms and moral 
rules as expediently determined by the physical structure, organic 
needs, desires, and interests of man. Opposed to idealism and to 
supernaturalism. 
Natural (law). See law. 
Nature, n. This is an ambiguous term which has various mean-
ings and usages. In modern thought it ordinarily means the 
world of physical events occurring in space and time; the things 
and products of the earth which exist apart from and in contrast 
to the influence or work of man. 
Commonly used also to designate the essential qualities or inner 
character of an object, organism, event, etc. "Men may change 
their climate, bu~ they cannot their nature." Steele. "The 
Passion of Love in its Nature has been thought to resemble Fire.,, 
Addison. 
Necessity, n. That whkh renders any given state of affairs such 
that there is no possibility for it to be otherwise than it is; 
traditionally there are three types of necessity, ( 1) logical or 
mathematical necessity, according to which anything is logically 
necessary where its denial would break a law of logic, ( 2) 
physical or causal necessity, according to which any thing or 
event is necessary where its denial would break a law of nature, 
and ( 3) moral necessity, according to which an obligation is 
morally necessary to be fulfilled where failure to do so would 
break a moral law. In logic, the idea of necessity is also used to 
designate a proposition whose truth can be asserted on a priori 
or purely logical grounds, in contrast to the contingent truth of 
any proposition which might have been other than it is; a 
proposition which is validly implied in an accepted set of proposi-
tions is also said to be "logically necessary". Where the idea of 
. 42 
causal necessity is carried over to a theory of cosmic necessity, 
i.e. that every thing and every event is determined according to 
causal necessity, it becomes synonymous with physical deter-
minism. Moral necessity clearly depends upon a prior interpreta-
tion of moral law as embodying ethical value; where these values 
and their evaluations are explained in terms of physical desires, 
needs, and interests, the tendency is to reduce moral necessity to 
causal nece~sity; where an attempt is made to establish an a 
p1·iori system of ethics, the tendency is to reduce moral necessity 
to logical necessity; and where the objectivity of ethical values 
is asserted and the moral life is defined in terms .of the rational 
choice of the higher values, moral necessity passes over into 
rational necessity in , the sense of rational determinism. See 
rational. 
Negation, n. The act of denying a proposition in contrast to the _ 
act of affirming it, as based upon the law of contradiction; thus, 
the affirmation of a proposition P implies· the negation of its 
contradictory not-P, while the affirmation of not-P implies the 
negation of P, and vice versa. It is to be noted that negation 
must be distinguished from the negative quality of a proposition; 
thus, when we affirm the proposition, "All A are B" is true, 
we imply the negation of its contradictory, i.e. "Some A are not 
B" is false, or when we affirm "No A are B" is true, we imply 
the negation of its contradictory, i.e. "Some A are B" is false, 
and so on. 
Negation is also sometimes used as synonymous with obvers_ion , 
i.e. the process in immediate inf ere nee of passing from an affirm-
ative (quality) proposition to a negative proposition which is 
exactly equivalent to it, and vice versa, ex. from All men are 
mortal to No men are immortal, etc. cf. J. Royce-"Negation", 
Enc. of R. & E., V. 9. 
N ominalism, n. The ( Scholastic) doctrine that universals or 
abstract term~ are mere names. The real things are the physical 
events and the data of sense-perception, for which universals are 
produced by man's intelligence as too~s for communication and 
environment control. U niversalia post rem ( universals after 
things). 
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Norm, n. A standard for measurement or evaluative judgment; 
type or pattern, usually with the qualitative implication of value 
as that which ought-to-be. 
Normative, a. Dealing with or concerning norms; opposed to 
descriptive. Thus, a descriptive science simply states the way 
things are, while a normative science states the way things 
ought-to-be, ex. psychology describes the way men do think, 
both "normally" and "abnormally", while logic considers how 
men ought to think in terms of correctness and validity. The 
natural sciences are all descriptive, while logic, ethics, and 
aesthetics are traditionally the three normative sciences. 
Object, n. Loosely, anything; more narrowly, something known 
to a subjecJ ,· anything perceived, imagined, or thought about, or 
anything which is desired, hated, avoided, sought, and so on. 
Objective, a. and n. Real in the sense of being external to the 
mind; that which is presented to but which does not belong to 
the conscious, perceiving, or thinking subject. Opposed to sub-
jective as that which does so belong, such as ideas, imaginations, 
feelings, and so on, which are private and personal. 
Principle of objectivity-the recognition, especially in science, 
that for sound verification of any hypothesis or theory the facts 
appealed to as evidence must be of such a sort that they can be 
experienced in the same way by any observer with normal human 
equipment of sense organs and nervous system. 
Eventually such an appeal to the common element in individual 
experiences, shared through language, is the final distinguishing 
mark of the objective in contrast to the merely subjective, though 
we use other indications of objectivity, such as regularity, rich-
ness of aspects, vividness, etc. 
Obligation, n. Broadly, any necessity for some one to do some-
thing; here various kinds and forms of necessity may be dis-
tinguished, as, for example, ( 1) natural compulsion, as when 
the heat of the flames obliged the rescuers to retire, ( 2) human 
force, as when a kidnapped victim is obliged to go off with a 
gangster, ( 3) social compulsion, as when one ( ex. a student) 
is obliged to enter the armed forces, ( 4) expedient direction, as 
when a man is obliged to refuse a friend a loan because he needs 
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the money for himself, and (5) moral necessity. For philosophy, 
"obligation" is primarily used to designate this fifth kind of neces-
sity, and it is customary to make a distinction here between 
categorical and hypothetical obligation or moral necessity. Hypo-
thetical obligation is in the form of a conditional command ; if 
you want or seek a given end or value, then you must do this in 
order to obtain it, ex. if you want to be popular, you must be 
friendly to oth rs, or, if you do not want to be sick, do not over-
eat. Categorical obligation has no such condition, but is in the 
form of an absolutely unconditioned command or imperative: 
you ought to do, or ought not to do, this or that, I must, or 
must not, do such and such, ex. thou shall not kill. Certain 
philosophers, such as Kant, consider hypothetical obligation to be 
merely rules of prudence or ways of expediency and as such to 
be morally neutral, the categorical imperative alone being really 
moral ; other philosophers consider that there are no categorical 
imperatives and that all moral obligations are hypothetical in one 
form or another. 
Observation, n. The primitive interpretation of that which is 
directly given in sense-experience. More commonly, the becom-
ing aware of objects or facts, usually implying intentional care 
and accuracy in seeing, hearing, etc. Observation is the complex 
process by which this is done. It involves the attentional selection 
of immediate sense-impressions and their interpretation as objects, 
etc., according to our interest and intention. "The observed of 
all observers." Shakespeare. See fact, perception. 
Ontology, n. That branch of philosophy which studies being as 
such; the critical investigation of beliefs as to the kind or kinds 
of ultimate reality. Synonymous with metaphysics in its older 
and narrower meaning. 
Opinion, n. A judgment or propos1t1on held without sufficient 
evidence for sound verification or reasoned conviction ; any view 
held as probably true. Usually contrasted in degree with knowl-
edge. "Error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free 
to combat it." Jefferson. 
Optimism, n. The view that the world is perfect, or the best of 
all possible worlds (Leibniz). Any theory which asserts a supreme 
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good or which considers the good to be primary in the sense 
that there must be some justifying reason for evil ( Plato, 
Royce, and all great idealists) is essentially optimistic-in a 
profound rather than the commonly shallow way. 
Pantheism> n. The doctrine that God and the Universe are one 
and the same ; God is everything, and everything is God. Op-
posed to theism. 
Parallelism> n. The dualistic doctrine that mind and body are 
ultimately and irreducibly different in kind, having no inter-
action with each other but running exactly parallel to each other 
so that there is a strict correspondence between mental and 
nervous or physical states, between mind and body. Both the 
mental and the physical are closed systems, but for every mental 
state there is a corresponding physical event and likewise for 
every physiological ( or brain or nervous) event there is a cor-
responding mental state, at least in the "sub-conscious" if not 
in the range of a_ctive awareness. 
In Spinoza's philosophy both the mental and the physical are 
simply modes or expressions of a single, underlying unity. 
Parsimony> n. Used to designate one of the principles of scientific 
verification and reflective thought-no more independent as-
sumptions should be made than are necessary to explain all the 
facts involved; reduce your foundation assumptions as far as 
possible; of two or more theories, equally consistent with all the 
facts which they purport to explain, that theory which has the 
smallest number of assumptions from which all the facts can be 
deduced is to be considered the true theory. First formulated by 
William of Occam in the rule, "Entities ( of explanation) are 
not to be multiplied beyond need." Sometimes called "Occam's 
Razor'·' ; now more commonly called the law or principle of 
parsimony. 
Particular> a. and n. Single member of a class; individual object, 
person, or event; opposed to uni'lJersal. 
Particular proposition-used in Aristotelian logic to designate 
a proposition in which the subject term is undistributed> i.e. a 
proposition which is indefinite, in that it does not say something 
definitely about the whole class of the subject, but only about 
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an indefinite part of the subject; the I and O propos1t1ons. In 
general, a particular proposition asserts that there are ( an indefi-
nite number of) objects of a certain sort. 
Perception, n. The act or process by which the mind refers its 
immediate sense-impressions to external objects as their cause; 
the apprehension of sense-objects. Now ordinarily distinguished 
both from immediate sense-experience (sensation) as the aware-
ness of particular sense-impressions, and from all higher mental 
processes, conception, imagination, and judgment. 
Person, n. Loosely, the conscious self,- defined in the Middle 
Ages by Boethius as "an individual substance of a rational na-
ture" ; conscious, rational continuity and character in and 
through desires, interests, and events, constituting an individual 
life-history. See individual. 
Personality, n. The unique totality of qualitative mental and 
physical characteristics of a rational individual; the peculiar 
unity, continuity, and uniqueness of the self or ego. cf. J. Mc-
Taggert-"Personality", Enc. of R. & E., V. 9. 
Persona/ism, n. A modern form of pluralistic idealism which is 
based upon the ultimate fact of personality, which is .considered 
to be of supreme value and central to the meaning of reality, 
emphasizing self-determination, freedom, and moral responsi-
bility, asserting the presence of real evil in the world, and gen-
erally, believing in a personal God who strives for right in 
overcoming evil. Personalism is also used as a modern term to 
signify any theory which asserts the supreme value and signifi-
cance of personality, and to designate this aspect in the thought 
of the philosophy of the past, as found, for example, in Heracli-
tus, Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and 
so on down through modern philosophy to the present. 
Pessimism, n. The view that the world-reality is absolutely evil, 
o·r that this is the worst of all possible worlds in which life is 
completely bad, so that it would be better had nothing existed 
at all (Schopenhauer) ; any theory or attitude which considers 
evil to outweigh the good, etc. 
Phenomenon, n. (pl. phenomena). Loosely used for anything 
going on as noticed or perceived. More strictly, that which 
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appears to consciousness or an immediate object of perception. 
It is sometimes used simply for the direct, flowing content of 
consciousness, and then again it is used to designate the objects, 
events, and facts into which this "brute flux" of sense-impressions 
is interpreted. The world of appearance (phenomenal world) in 
contrast to the world as it is in itself ( noumenal world), the 
first being the world we know in experience while the second we 
cannot know (Kant) . 
Phenomena/ism~ n. The epistemological doctrine that all knowl-
edge is limited to physical and/ or mental phenomena; this doc-
trine then takes one of two more metaphysical forms, either (a) 
asserting that there is no reality of things-in-themselves under-
lying the phenomena of experience ( Hodgson, etc.), or ( b) 
affirming the reality of things-in-themselves but asserting that 
they cannot be known ( Kant, etc.) See phenomena. 
PhenomenologJ'~ n. This is a term which has been variously used 
in modern philosophy by Kant, Hegel, etc. However, Edmund 
Husserl was the first to use it to designate a whole philosophical 
system, and, although he himself varied the precise connotation 
of the term, his use of it may be briefly defined as signifying the 
intuition of essences without raising questions of existence ( or 
truth). 
Philosophy, n. That subject of intellectual act1v1ty which asks 
the largest, most general, and ultimate questions in a search for 
first principles. It is the intellectual effort toward a reasoned 
theory of the whole of reality which will give unity to all 
branches of knowledge, combining the common experiences of 
life and the results of scientific investigation into a harmonious 
and consistent system and an adequate interpretation of man 
and his place in reality. "What am I? What ought I to do? 
What may I hope and believe? All philosophy may be reduced 
to this." G. C. Lichtenberg. "A philosopher is one who desires 
to discern the truth." Plato. 
Physicalism, n. The doctrine that every descriptive term in 
science, including psychology and the social sciences, designates, 
or refers to other terms which designate, observable properties of 
things or events. and, hence, is verifiable by observation . 
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Pluralism, n. Used to designate any system according to which 
reality is composed of more than one ultimate principle or sub-
stance; usually recognizing many individual or particular ulti-
mate constituents which cannot be reduced to each other or to 
any underlying common principle. See monism. cf. F. J. E. 
Woodbridge, Enc. of R. & E., V. 10. 
Politics, n. Traditionally the normative study of the good life 
for man in society and the state, thus constituting an inseparable 
complement to or part of ethics ( Plato, Aristotle) ; now gen-
erally distinguished and referred to as political philosophy or the 
philosophy of the state, restricting the term "politics" as a 
theoretical study to political science, which is primarily con-
cerned with forms of government and state affairs; as an accept-
edly unsavory term it designates the questionable, and less ques-
tionable, practical processes of man's official relations with men. 
"The good man must be the end of the science of politics." 
Aristotle. 
Political philosophy, n. That branch of philosophy which is con-
cerned with the nature, function, and justification of the state-
properly based upon ethics and the nature of man. 
Positivism, n. A variety of naturalism which leaves the ultimate 
matter or stuff of reality undefined, but which asserts that every 
real existent is linked up with others and controlled in strict 
causal order and law, and hence that all existents (reality) come 
under the observation and description of some one of the positive 
sciences. See naturalism. 
The name' "positivism" was first associated with the doctrine of 
the French philosopher, Auguste Comte, that men's explanation 
of the world naturally runs through three evolutionary stages 
( "law of three stages") ; these three stages he asserted were first 
the theological, in which natural events are explained by refer-
ring them to divine powers with anthropomorphic wills; second 
the metaphysical stage, in which natural events are explained 
by referring them to depersonalized, separate energies, ex. fire 
by a principle of heat, life by a vital force, etc. ; and third, the 
positive stage, in which natural events are described by referring 
them to causes. This positive stage of thought denies the super-
natural, but seeks to preserve that which man has cherished in 
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religion by substituting Humanity for God as the object of man's 
loyal service and devotion. 
Positivism as a metaphysical theory should be distinguished both 
from the epistemological doctrine of phenomena/ism and from the 
modern movement called "logical positivism". 
Logical positivism-A modern movement ( 1924, the date when 
the "Y ienna Circle" of philosophe~s .was founded) combining 
the older empiricism of Hume and Mill, positivism as defined 
above, the methods of natural science, symbolic logic, and espe.-
cially the analysis of language, into a movement stressing the 
unity of science, the empirical verification of fact, directly or 
indirectly, for all knowledge, and the great importance of logical 
analysis of language. This last emphasis is perhaps the distin-
guishing mark of "logical positivism", which asserts that the 
function of philosophy is the analysis of knowledge and that this 
is to be accomplished primarily by a logical analysis of the 
language of science. 
Possibility, n. Anything which does not contain its own nega-
tion. See.. possible. 
Possible, a. and n. Any proposition or happening which does not 
contain its own negation; in philosophy, anything is "possible" 
until it is shown to be impossible (denied) by the established 
acceptance of its contradictory or negation, i.e. that which is 
impossible can only be asserted on the basis of the actual state of 
affairs (in all probability, or as far as known) which contradicts 
it. Sometimes used to designate that which usually, but not 
necessarily, happens (Aristotle) ; also used for that about which 
one is ignorant, except that one knows nothing to the contrary, 
i.e. nothing necessarily contradictory. Thus, one should be most 
careful to avoid the rather common confusion of the currently 
improbable with the impossible. 
Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Latin, literally translated-after this, 
therefore on account of this. This is one of the commonest of . 
·logical (material) fallacies, against which one must be constantly 
·on guard. It is the false argument or uncritical acceptance that 
an event is caused by an antecedent event simply because of a 
close temporal sequence; exs.-a farmer cuts his clover on a 
Friday only to have it ruined by bad weather in the following 
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days, and so he concludes that Friday is an unlucky day; I eat 
spinach for dinner and have a headache all evening, and thus 
believe that spinach ·caused my headache; the Fall of Rome 
followed the official adoption of Christianity, and it was then 
argued that Christianity was the cause of the Fall of Rome. 
Postulate, n. An assumption which is a logical prerequisite in 
intelligible inquiry; an axiom or principle, demonstrable or 
undemonstrable, which is accepted as necessary to ethical living 
and the fulfilment of our moral duty (Kant, etc.); for example, 
that the world has some ordered connections rather than being 
a complete chaos is a prerequisite without which scientific in-
vestigation is impossible-this assumption of order is thus a 
postulate for science ; again, the ethics of rational choice is 
meaningless unless the agent has some power of choice, and thus 
freedom of the will in some sense is a prerequisite of morality, 
i.e. is a postulate. See presupposition. · 
Practical, a. Concerned with given things, desires, and events as 
they actually are or occur; concerned with activity and particu-
lars rather than with speculation and the general or universal ; 
vulgarly contrasted with the theoretical. 
Pragmatic, a. Concerned with consequences in terms of · human 
desires and interests; any theory which estimates or judges in 
terms of the practical consequences for human interests; "coun-
sels of prudence" (Kant) ; purely expedient in practical affairs. 
Pragmatic theory of truth. The doctrine that an idea or an 
observation is shown to be true if when acted upon the antici-
pated consequences are experienced to follow (method of testing 
truth by consequences), and that such successful consequences 
in terms of effects on human interests constitute truth itself ( the 
meaning of truth) . 
P,·agmatism, n. The philosophical system which says that reality, 
as given in experiencing, it to be defined, explained, and judged 
in terms of its successful working out for human desires and 
interests; the whole meaning of a concept is found in its practical 
effects, so that judgments of truth, goodness, and beauty are 
simply assertions of a belief as that which now meets an indi-
vidual's conscious needs. Royce said, the pragmatist forgets that 
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"it is one function of truth to be, amongst other things, actually 
true." Pragmatism may be considered as a modern and glorified 
elaboration of the old doctrine that "Man is a measure of all 
things, of things that are, that they are; and of things that are 
not, that they are not." Protagoras of Abdera. 
Predestination, n. Any theory of theological determinism; espe-
cially the Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine of God's appoint-
ment from all eternity of some individuals to salvation; God's 
fore-ordering of all that happens and is to happen. "Predesti-
nation we call the eternal decree of God whereby He has deter-
mined what He would have to become of every individual of 
mankind. Eternal life is ordained for some, and eternal damna-
tion for others." John Calvin. 
Predicate, n. In traditional logic, that which is asserted or denied 
of the subject by means of the copula, which is some part of the 
verb "to be". 
Predicate, v. To assert something about a subject. 
Premise, n. ( Sometimes, · following Chas. S. Peirce, spelled 
"Premiss"). A proposition, either alone or one of several, from 
which another is inferred upon the basis of the formal properties 
of the given proposition. 
Presupposition, n. Loosely used for anything which is assumed 
for the basis of an argument; more strictly, it is almost synony-
mous with postulate, and these two terms are often used inter-
changeably; that which is a prerequisite for intellectual explana-
tion; what must necessarily exist or be real in order that some-
thing else may exist or be real; ex. Kant's presupposition of 
freedom, one of his three "postulates of morality", based upon 
the experienced fact of obligation or imperative duty-I ought, 
therefore I can, i.e. if the "ought" is real, the "can" is real also 
as its foundation or necessary condition; "the real is the rational, 
and the rational is the real," (Hegel) , is often considered to be 
the one fundamental presupposition properly common to both 
science and philosophy. See postulate, assumption, and axiom. 
Primary qualities, n. Traditionally these are solidity, motion, 
extension, figure, rest, and number, as qualities or properties 
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which really belong to the object as inherent in it and inseparable 
from it, in contrast to the secondary qualities which appear in 
the mind but which do not belong to the object itself. While 
found in Democritus, and stated by Galilei and Descartes, the 
classic distinction in philosophy between the primary and sec-
ondary qualities was made by John Locke. 
Principle, n. A fundamental law, cause, axiom or universal truth 
in any given field of explanation; that which is ultimately the 
basis for the existence of something. "The value of a principle 
is the number of things it will explain." Emerson. 
Principle of sufficient reason. The doctrine that there is a justify-
ing reason ( in terms of good or value) why things are as they 
are or happen as they do rather than otherwise. (Used in a 
more technical way in conjunction with the principle of non-
contradiction as the foundation for his whole philosophic system 
by Leibniz) . 
Probability, a. In general, synonymous with likelihood or chances; 
an expression of the ratio of knowledge to ignorance for the con-
ditions upon which the actual happening of any event depends. 
"Probability must atol\e for the waqt of truth." M. Prior. 
Probable, a. That which is expected to happen or to prove to be 
true in terms of the ratio between knowledge and ignorance of its 
conditions, as in probability defined above; or something which 
belongs to a certain class, most of which has a given character, 
so it probably has this character also. 
Problem, n. A situation, practical or theoretical, presenting suf-
ficient complexity to cause difficulty in the immediate fulfilment 
of an aim or purpose, and thereby giving rise to reflective 
thought; any situation in which reflex action or habitual response 
is inadequate for the fulfilment of desire or purpose. 
Proposition, n. A statement which can be said to be true or false. 
While all propositions have 'to be expressed or conveyed in sym-
bols, the proposition is not the sentence or formula which states 
· it, as is seen by the fact for example that the same proposition may 
be stated in different languages, i.e. in different symbols. 
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Prnpositional function. An expression contammg one or more 
variables, thus rendering it neither true nor false, but which 
does state a proposition when "values" ( i.e. content) are given 
to the variable or variables. The "variable" is simply a blank 
to be filled in. 
Psycholo_qy, n. The descriptive science which studies the behavior 
of an entire organism in relation to its environment; the scien-
tific study of the structure, function, and behavior of the mind 
in the attempt to discover and formulate its laws. 
Purpose, n. A desired goal-properly with the implication of 
value as its justification or the point in seeking it. 
Quality, n. Used in logic to designate the property of a proposi-
tion as being either affirmative or negative. Traditionally the 
A and I propositions are affirmative, and the E and O negative. 
Quantity, n. U ~ed in logic to designate the property of a propo-
sition as being either universal or particular. Traditionally the 
A and E propositions are universal, and the I and O particular. 
Rational, a. Endowed with reason or the faculty of reasoning, · 
traditionally considered as the distinctive characteristic of man 
in contrast to the other animals; more strictly used ·to signify 
determination in terms of value or worth, as in rational action 
which i_s action undertaken for a purpose or value which is 
judged worthy of fulfilment; rational choice which is choice. as 
determined by the higher or highest value involved; a rational 
universe which is . one in which there is justification of value, 
usually called "sufficient reason," why things are as they are and 
behave as they do rather than otherwise. 
Rationalism, n. ( 1) In epistemology, the doctrine that the 
criterion of truth is found in reason and deductive thought 
rather than in sensory experience. Opposed to empiricism. See 
reason, a priori, empi1·icism. 
( 2) In metaphysics. belief in the primacy of reason in man, 
and/ or of rational principles and structure in the universe. Op-
posed to voluntarism, irrationalism. 
Rationality, n. Probably an ultimate term which is essentially 
indefinable except in terms of its conditions. The fundamental 
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principle of rationality is seeking or being determined by the-
higher of two or the highest of more than two values or worths 
as they are presented in experience. 
Rationalization> n. Hiding actual, and usually inferior, bad, or 
disgraceful, motives or reasons by artificially substituting ac-
ceptable or good intentions and arguments for them; the process 
of justifying or defending our ideas or actions by finding good 
or acceptable reasons for going on believing or doing that which 
we are already determined to believe or do on other than logical 
and critically honest grounds; such a process may be one either 
of self-deception or of deceiving others; ex. a sadistic father 
whips his boy because he enjoys hurting him but claims that he 
does it for the boy's own good. 
Reat a. That which ultimately and objectively Is; having abso-
lute and necessary, rather than spacial and temporal existence>-
contrasted with appearance. cf. C. D. Broad, "Reality", Enc .. 
of R. & E., V. 10. 
Realism> n. Vulgarly used for the attitude and practice of regard-
ing and dealing with things and events as they actually are with-
out personal prejudice, or wi·shful consideration as to how they· 
ought to be, as in modern realism in literature, etc. In modern 
philosophy, loosely used to designate any system which asserts 
the objective existence of an independently real, external world 
of things and events, independent of all consciousness, and which 
denies that the universe can be reduced to any terms of mind or 
principles of rational spirit; opposed to idealism. In epistemol-
ogy> the doctrine, in direct opposition to Platonic and Scholastic 
realism, that experience and knowledge are of an objectively 
independent world ; opposed to epistemological idealism. Here 
three forms of modern realism should be distinguished : 
Naive realism is the name given to the carelessly unthinking view· 
t'hat man sees the real world just as it independently is through 
his eyes, and other senses, as windows, or that in sense-percep-
tion he receives a literal copy or an exact picture of the external 
world as it really is in itself. 
The new realism is the name given to the doctrine that the real 
objective world is directly known in perception without the 
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mediation of any mental states, ideas, or sensations; m our 
awareness of objects we are aware of them, rather than of any 
visual, tactile, or auditory sensations of them; the relations 
between objects are also directly presented in knowledge as real 
and objective; thus, the mind does not relate the things which it 
grasps, and the things and their relations are entirely unaffected 
by being known or remaining unknown. 
Critical realism, the most recent school of modern realism, is 
the name given to the doctrine that the perception of objects is 
not immediate but that we infer them from sense-data; against 
both the subjectivist and the absolute idealist, critical realism 
asserts the outer objective existence of things independently of 
mind, but these are not actually apprehended or purely given to 
the mind in the sense-data of experience; on the contrary, the 
data of perception reflects the outer object only as it appears to 
a perceiving mind, so that the actual sense-data are apparently a 
mediating medium of knowledge between the brute object, which 
is never immediately apprehended, and the perceiving mind, i.e. 
the datum or essence, as it is sometimes called, is a third entity 
which is immediately given in sense, but which is neither any 
· part of the perceiving mind nor any part of the actually outer 
objects, which are never directly known but which are accepted 
as behind the "essences" only on (animal) faith. 
Platonic Realism. The doctrine that the Ideas are objectively 
independent of, and more real than the sensible objects, which 
are imperfect copies or embodiments of them. 
Scholastic Realism. The doctrine, following Plato, that uni-
versals have an independent, intrinsic existence prior to the 
particulars which embody them-universalis ante rem. See 
nominalism and conceptualism. 
Reality, n. As spelled with a capital "R", the whole of that 
which, finally, and absolutely is; the real nature or essence of a 
thing or event in contrast to its mere appearance. 
Reason, n. The thinking faculty of the human mind as opposed 
to volition and feeling; the intellectual faculty for logical infer-
ence; the mental power for adapting thought or action to ends 
or goais . 
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In Medieval Scholasticism the contrast between reason and 
faith was hotly debated in terms of three positions, faith above 
reason, faith contrary to reason, and faith beyond but not con-
trary to reason-in all cases using reason merely to signify the 
use of the mental powers in knowing. In Kant and others, reason 
is used in a more specialized sense to designate a faculty of mind 
which is the source of all a priori synthetic forms in experience. 
See a priori, category, etc. 
Reason also signifies a statement used to justify some act, asser-
tion, belief, judgment, etc.; here reason is linked with value in 
the sense that a reason for a thing or event is its value-justifica-
tion, i.e. the answer to the question, Why? See rationality, prin-
ciple of sufficient reason. cf. F. Wittaker-"Reason", Enc. of. 
R. & E., V. 10. 
Reflection, n. The intellectual process by which correct beliefs or 
conclusions are reached for any given problem, usually called 
the method of reflective thought or simply reflective thinking. 
"Scientific method" is merely a specialized form of reflective 
thinking, using intensified care in observation and, wherever 
possible, the controlled conditions of experiment. Reflection is 
also used for the knowledge which the mind has of itself and 
of its operations (Locke). 
Relation, n. Any connection or association which exists or can 
be asserted between two or more things, events, ideas, etc. This 
is an ultimate notion which is hard to define. 
Relative, a. That which has no absolute existence but which 
derives its quantity, quality, or meaning in terms of something 
else, ex. motion, size, duration, etc. 
Relative terms. In traditional logic those terms which · depend 
upon or imply another for their meaning, as, for example, hus-
band implies wife, father implies child, etc. Correlative is the 
name given to the name implied by the relative term. 
Religion, n. A way of life in terms of 'reality interpreted as per-
sonal or spiritual' in some form or forms; belief in the primacy 
of super-natural reality as rational, ultimate value, or spirit, ex. 
the Idea of the Good (Plato), God the Father (Christianity), 
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etc. · Reduced to a common denominator all religions involve 
some conception of some unseen spiritual power or powers, or 
some interpretation of the primary reality of the supernatural, 
and some responsive attitude in man as a result. "The things seen 
are temporal, but the things unseen are eternal," and "What 
shall I do to be saved ?" The aspiration of man to become spirit-
ually more than he already is; the striving to realize in his own 
life the Highest, Best, or to put himself in a position of advan-
tage in relation to that Best if it be conceived as subsumed in a 
Deity or Deitie. See theism, pantheism, 111j1sticism, the absolute,. 
etc. 
Scepticism, n. The doctrine that no objective truth or knowledge· 
is attainable by man, thus, in effect, denying a real external world, 
the self, and all other categories of objectivity and reducing-
everything to the merely given ensations of awareness as they 
occur. See agnosticism. 
Science, n. "The complete and consistent description of the facts 
of experience in the simplest possible terms." (Thomson) ; gen-
eral and systematic knowledge in which specific, existential propo-
sitions are derived from a few fundamental principles. 
Secondary qualities, n. Defined by John Locke as "such qualities, 
which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers. 
to produce various sensations in use by their primary qualities, 
i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible· 
parts, as colors, sounds, tastes, etc." This distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities Bishop Berkley shortly after-· 
wards denied, asserting that both are alike merely ideas in our 
mind, etc. 
Self, n. The ego, I, m,e, personality; the unique unity and con-
tinuity in and through all changes of thought, sensations and so 
on, by virtue of which a rational person calls himself "I", and 
by which the distinction is made among selves between myself· 
and other selves. See person, individual, etc. 
Certain philosopher , notably Hume, have denied the existence· 
of the self on the ground of introspective experience, that "I never 
can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never 
can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions-
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are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I in-
sensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist." Kant, 
while admitting that we never have a perception of the self as 
such, denied that this denies the self, on the ground that the 
self as the subject of experience cannot as such become the object 
of that experience. 
Sensation, n. Loosely used as synonymous with perception; more 
strictly sensation is the immediate mental awareness which con-
stitutes the primitive content of perception, or the qualities thus 
sensed . 
.Sense, n. Any of the specialized bodily functions by which nerve 
impulses are set up, and, in human beings, conscious sensations 
are roused. 
Sense-organ, n. The specialized organic structures themselves, 
technically called receptors. 
Sense-impression, n. Practically synonymous with sensation ex-
cept for a narrower implication of an external reference. 
Sense-datum, n. Sensation or sense-impression. 
Solipsism, n. In metaphysics, an extreme form of subjective ideal-
ism which asserts that the thinker and his experiences alone exist . 
.Sophistry, n. Speciou but fallacious reasoning which is intended 
to deceive. 
Space, n. Loosely u ed for continuous extension in all directions; 
the perceived relations of position, direction, and distance between 
object relative to each other; the interval between points in 
terms of three dimen ions . 
. Space-Time, n. The fusion of the concept of space and of time to 
form a four-dimensional continuum constituting the structural 
relations of event . 
Species, n. See genus. 
,Speculation, n. In philosophy, synonymous with intellectual, 
imaginative, and appreciative "seeing" of all things clearly and 
as a whole. In this, the true philosophic vision is akin to that of 
the poet, artist, and musician. 
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Statistics, n. pl. Exact numerical recotds of group phenomena 
systematically collected for use in scientific description. 
Subject, n. In traditional logic, that of which the presence or 
absence, quality, property, attribute, or accident is asserted; used 
in a more specialized sense in epistemology for the experiencer 
who interprets the private content of consciousness or immediate 
sensations into an objective world of things and events; subject 
is here contrasted with object. 
Subjective, a. See objective. 
Subsistence, n. Used for the type of being predicated of substance 
in contrast to that of its qualities or any change of them. Also 
used for the non-physical and non-mental type of being, predi-
cated of logical properties, universals, values, eternal entities, 
etc., as distinguished from the spacial and temporal existence of 
particular things and events. See existence, etc. 
Substance, n. That which exists in, by, and for itself; that which 
ultimately Is; anything that can stand alone, mental or physical, 
and not necessarily limited to materal "stuff"; the essential 
.r;iature underlying phenomena. Also used more narrowly in this 
last connection as that which is permanent and self-supporting, 
in which the properties, qualities, and changes of a thing inhere; • 
that of which properties, qualities, etc. are asserted or denied-
see the first definition of subject. 
Substratum, n. Usually used as synonymous with the second 
meaning of substance, but to be distinguished from the first as 
given above; that which underlies the sensuously experienced 
qualities as their cause; the thing-in-itself in which its ( experi-
enced) qualities, properties, and changes inhere. 
Supernatural, a. and n. Loosely used for that which is miraculous 
and inexplicable as contrary to nature, i.e. mysteriously outside 
the ordinary operations of cause and effect in spacial and tem-
poral events. 
:More strictly, used to designate a realm of reality outside or 
beyond the world of nature but in no sense contrary to it, the 
realm of spirit, rationality, values, etc . 
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Superstition, n. A belief which is held in spite of adequate, gen-
erally accepted, and easily available evidence to the contrary-
thus, what is a false belief in one level of knowledge becomes a 
superstitious belief when held in a period of more adequate 
knowledge, ex. night air is apt to cause malaria. 
Syllogism, n. A form of logical argument consisting of three 
assertions (propositions), of which one ( the conclusion) is said 
to be inferred from the other two ( the premises) as taken to-
gether. See inference. 
Symbol, n. Anything which is used to stand for, to represent 
·something in experience; the essence of language, any language, 
spoken, written, flag-waved, etc., is that it uses "symbols" which 
are publicly recognized to stand for or represent objects, events, 
emotions, etc. in experience and which communicate such experi-
ence from one person to another; in the case of spoken or written 
language, the symbols are what we call words, having the two 
logical characteristics of denotation and connotation; in logic 
and mathematics, in order to avoid the ambiguities and inexact-
ness of ordinary language, a special logical language is used to 
represent forms without regard to content, ex. All A are B, or 
xy equals yx, etc. 
Synoptic, a. An act of thought in which the whole with all its 
constituents parts and their interrelations is seen at once in its 
entirety; more generally, the point of view of the broad general 
survey; breadth of vision to see a wide range of things and/or 
events in their proper perspective. 
Synthesis, n. The process of combining or putting together simpler 
parts or ideas into larger, connected wholes, theories or systems; 
opposed to analysis. 
Used in a specialized sense in Hegel's "dialectic" for the fusion 
of opposed ideas ( thesis and antithesis) into a higher unity ( syn-
thesis) combining the true in each of the apparently contradic-
tory ideas, ex. thesis, Being; its opposite or antithesis, Not-Being; 
combined in the synthesis, Becoming. 
Synthetic, a. The adjective for synthesis,· belonging to the process 
of synthesis. 
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Synthetic judgment. Used .by Kant to designate a proposition in 
which the predicate is not contained in the subject of which it is 
asserted ( ex. this house is red, and since there is no logical 
necessity why a house should not be blue or any other color, the 
predicate "red" is not logically implied _in the subject) ; con-
trasted with analytic judgment. 
TautologyJ n. A statement in which the subject and predicate, 
or the basic ideas involved in them, are the same and differ in 
words only; ex. all spherical objects are round, or, too much 
smoking is bad for one. 
TeleologyJ n. The doctrine or study of ends, final causes, pur-
poses, and values; the explanation of events by the end they reach 
or by purposes or final causes rather than by their antecedent 
events or efficient causes; the doctrine that developments are 
caused by the purposes, ends, or goals which they serve ; opposed 
to all naturalistic and mechanical theories which explain the 
present exclusively in terms of the past, but whereas all natural-
istic theories necessarily deny teleology, rational interpretations 
in terms of purposes and values are not necessarily incompatible 
with the explanation by antecedent events, i.e. final causation 
does not of itself contradict efficient causes. 
TermJ n. ln its widest meaning ynonymous with word; more 
strictly in logic it is synonymous with name, and as such it may 
be composed of one or many words, ex. dog, apple-tree, John 
James Doe, an unusually intelligent member of the United States 
Senate, etc.; the subject or the predicate of a proposition. 
TheismJ n. The doctrine of God's existence; belief in a unitary 
supernatural being related to the universe, usually as ruler and 
the arbiter of the destinies of men, but noJ identified with the 
universe; belief in a personal, spiritual being who is both 
transcendent ( i.e. God's power, goodness, etc. are not exhausted 
in the existent universe), and immanent (i.e. God in his activity 
is within the world, so that men may know Him and have com-
munion with Him) : contrasted both with deism and with pan-
theism. cf. A. E. Taylor "Theism", Enc. of R. & E., V. 12. cf. 
also J. Royce-"Monotheism", Enc. of R. & E., V. 8 . 
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T heolog}', n. In its widest • meaning that branch of philosophy 
which is concerned with the problem of God's existence, nature, 
and relation to the world; now, however, customarily restricted 
to designate the theoretical aspects of a given religion, or even 
of a given creed within a given religion, ex. Jewish, Christiant 
Roman Catholic, Episcopalian theology, etc. 
Theory, n. A broad, comprehensive description or interpretation 
whic;h explains many events, narrower laws, and so on, by show-
ing them to follow from it as implied consequences. Used also 
to designate degrees of verification and certainty for any ex-
planatory description, as when an hypothesis receives and upholds 
partial verification it is called a theory, and upon receiving 
adequate verification for general acceptance in its field it is then 
called a law. Vulgarly used for the abstract in ~pposition to the 
• practical. 
Theosophy, n. Loosely, a doctrine or sect claiming to obtain privi-
leged knowledge of God through direct intuition, ecstasy, peculiar 
personal relations, peculiar knowledge of secret symbols, num-
bers, etc. 
Thesis, n. Any position or proposition which is to be asserted or 
maintained; for its special use in the Hegelian dialectic see 
synthesis. 
Time, n. Loosely used for duration; the perceived relation of 
successi~n of events, of before and after in experience; the con-
cept of intervals in terms of past, present, and future-; the experi-
enced "now" in relation to a: "no-longer" and a "not-yet"; see 
space. The nature of time and of space constitutes two of the 
oldest and most puzzling problems in philosophy, defying any 
adequate definition of them apart from a philosophical inter-
pretation. c;f. C. D. Broad-"Time", Enc. of R. & E., V. 12 .. 
Timeless, a. Loosely and mistakenly used to signify unending; 
· properly that which is outside time; not subject to time 
sequences or the concept of time. 
Transcendent, a. and n. That which goes beyond or which is not 
realizable in experience or in some aspect of experience. Used by 
the Scholastics to signify that ·which is higher than and thus not 
included under the ten categories. 
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Used for the being of God as ex1stmg apart from and/or not 
subject to the limitations of the physical universe--sometimes 
even as having no relation to the physical universe. Contrasted 
with immanence. See theism. 
Transcendental, a. Used in a special sense by Kant both for the a 
priori forms of thought, space, time, substance, cause, etc. 
and for the attempt to apply these forms which are valid only in 
the field of human experience to the things-in-themselves. 
Used by the Medieval Schoolmen for the most general predi-
cates, such as truth, goodness, and so on. Generally used for any 
theory asserting a priori forms and principles. 
Transcendentalism, n. An indefinitely idealistic attitude rather 
than a systematic philosophy, developed in New England around 
1836 and centering in Emerson, combining mysticism and prag-
matism, individualism and restrained optimism, etc.; transcen-
dentalism finds true knowledge in spiritual sources that lie beyond 
empirical experience in terms of the divinity of nature and the 
intrinsic worth of man. Opposed to empiricism, rationalism, ma-
terialism, predestination, deism, etc. 
True, a. A proposition expressing a content which is in accord 
with existence or reality. This is the basic "truth of fact" as 
delimited by some problem or interest. To such truth the inter-
ested response is necessarily "So what?", leading on into the 
truth of interpretation as expressing the essential significance of 
conclusions (for man) in accord with · underlying reality. No 
attempt is made here to define the ultimate value Truth as 
spelled with a capital "T". cf. J. Royce, "Error and Truth", 
Enc. of R. & E., V. 5. 
Undistributed, a. See distribution. 
Universal, a. and n. Any term which holds of or throughout the 
universe, the whole world, or all nature; pertaining to all things, 
events, or people in the universe; belonging to all members or 
applicable to all instances of a given class under consideration. 
Universal proposition-used in traditional logic to designate a 
proposition in which the subject term is distributed, i.e. one 
which says something definite about the whole of the class which 
constitutes the subject, eg. the A and the E propositions. For its 
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more specialized usage by Plato and the Medieval Schoolmen 
see idea, Platonic realism, Scholastic realism, conceptualism, and 
nominalism. 
Universe, n. All existence; the whole of created or existing 
things ; all that is in space and time. 
Universe of discourse. Used in logic to designate that field which 
is under cons1deration or the domain of reference; the field about 
which one is talking; more technically, that class for which all 
classes considered are sub-classes in it. 
Utilitarianism, n. Defined by J. S. Mill as "the creed which 
accepts as the foundation of morals utility, or the greatest hap-
piness principle and holds that actions are right in proportion as 
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce 
the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and 
the absence of pain ; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of 
pleasure." Traditionally a refined form of ethical hedonism, 
stressing the general rather than individual happiness; in more 
recent years the tendency has been to broaden out the idea: of 
happiness to that of general welfare in terms of desires, needs, 
and interests, socially interpreted and to be expediently fufilled, 
thus passing over into the expediency ethics of pragmatism, as in 
James, Dewey, etc. 
Valid, a. Used to designate the character of an instance of rea-
soning in which a conclusion follows from the premise or premises 
which are asserted for it, due to the formal properties of the 
propositions involved. 
Validity, n. Being valid in that a conciusion does necessarily fol-
· low from the premise or premises which purport to imply it. 
Validity is not a question of truth or falsity of propositions, but is 
concerned exclusively with the formal properties of proposition~ 
and their relations as used in reasoning. 
Value, n. and v. The object of desire or interest-rationally 
with the implication that the object is justified or the desire is 
worthy of fulfilment in the sense of that which ought-to-be ; the 
goal of purpose as judged to be worthy of fulfilment. Here 
"value" is sometimes used abstractly as the property of worth or 
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goodness or as of being of worth or goodness; used concretely, 
"value" then either refers to things which have the property of 
worth or goodness or to things which are "valued" by a subject. 
As a verb, to "value" signifies a direct experiencing of worth, 
of good, of immediate appreciation, etc., while evaluating desig-
nates a mental act of judging a thing to be of worth or goodness, 
or to express a mental attitude of holding something in favor 
and acceptance as judged to be justified in terms of worth or 
goodness. 
In this connection a distinction is made between value and 
existence as the contrast between the "ought" and the "is", with 
a division of philosophic interpretation concerning the relation 
between them, many philosophers, however, recognizing that 
the "ought" cannot be derived from the "is". 
A further distinction is usually made between two kinds of 
value, instrumental and intrinsic values: 
Instrumental value is one which derives its worth from that to 
which it leads, ex. food has instrumental value in its service for 
living. 
Intrinsic value is one which contains its own justification as that 
which ought-to-be; ex. in idealistic ethics the idea of human dig-
nity is such a value in itself. Most values, except perhaps purely 
economic ones, if there are any such, are both instrumental and 
intrinsic, differing in degree ·and emphasis; thus, food is primarily 
an instrumental value, but, as well selected and skillfully cooked, 
it has a certain intrinsic value of delight in itself, and human 
dignity, while it is primarily worthy in itself as its own justifi-
cation, has also an instrumental value in its service to successful 
social relations, and so on. 
As to the metaphysical status of value, the sharpest division of 
interpretation is that concerning the relativity vs. the objectivity 
of values, the nature of ultimate value, and the problem of a 
standard of evaluation and the scale of values. 
Verification> n. In "scientific method" the process of testing the 
truth of a suggested solution to a problem, of an observation, 
of an hypothesis, and so on, by checking its implied consequences 
with the empirical facts of the situation through further· obser-
vation, experiment, etc . 
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Vitalism, n. The doctrine that life, its origin, organization, and 
activity, depends upon an indeterminable, special or unique life-
principle which transforms the physico-chemical sum of parts 
and changes into a directed organic whole and process. 
Voluntarism, n. The doctrine in metaphysics that the will con-
stitutes ultimate reality; the reality of nature, including man, 
is ultimately blind, ceaselessly striving will; in ethics, it asserts 
the primacy of will as the core of all moral questions, so that 
good itself is determined by the will, i.e. the good is good because 
I will it. 
T¥ill, n. Broadly, the conscious functioning of volition and desire; 
the self as activity, striving, struggling, and desiring; the ener-
getic or "ambitious" aspect of man; more narrowly, the mental 
process of choice between conflicting desires, needs, and interests, 
involving the recognition of alternatives, deliberation, and deci-
sion as the release of activity. The checking of an idea long 
enough for an opposing or antagonistic idea to be established in 
the mind; the effort of attention in holding a difficult idea fast 
before the mind-in this sense, the will is always negative, never 
positive (Wm. James, Plato, St. Augustine, P. E. More) cf. 
J. Laird-"Will", Enc. of R. & E., Vol. 12. 
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